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Abstract 
 
Public sector reform has been around since the 1980s and was a result of criticism 
against traditional public administration for being too slow and inefficient to address 
public needs. Although Public sector reform is common in developed countries, 
evidence of public sector reform has rarely been seen in developing countries. The 
purpose of this investigation is to determine whether there is any evidence of public 
sector reform in a developing country such as South Africa. 
 
The author divides public sector reform into three categories, namely: new 
governance, regulatory governance and new public management (NPM). Based on 
the theoretical information analysed, a list of qualifying criteria for public sector 
reform is compiled. The author then focuses on the Perishable Products Export 
Control Board (PPECB), a statutory organisation acting as a service provider for the 
perishable products export industry and a regulator on behalf of the South African 
government. The author analyses the model on which South African perishable 
exports are based and studies the organisation‟s history, strategies, operational 
structure and its relationship with government. The information gathered is then 
compared to the list of qualifying criteria compiled for public sector reform.  
 
It was found that the model, and specifically service delivery strategies by the 
PPECB, provides conclusive evidence of new governance, regulatory governance 
and NPM. It was also found the model is a hybrid between traditional public 
administration and public sector reform, as it contains characteristics of both.  
 
The study takes the form of a literature review. Research was conducted through 
studying various literatures pertaining to new governance, regulatory governance 
and new public management. In addition, the author gathered relevant information 
from within the PPECB, the South African Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (DAFF) and the export industry. Further information was also collected by 
means of unstructured interviews with senior individuals employed by the PPECB. 
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Opsomming 
 
Openbare hervorming bestaan sedert die jare tagtig en het basies ontstaan as 
gevolg van kritiek omdat tradisionele openbare administrasie te traag en onbevoeg 
was om openbare behoeftes aan te spreek. Hoewel openbare hervorming in 
ontwikkelde lande stewig gevestig is, is daar ook bewys daarvan in ontwikkelende 
lande. Die doel van hierdie ondersoek was om vas te stel of daar enige bewys van 
openbare hervorming in ‟n ontwikkelende land soos Suid-Afrika bestaan. 
 
Die outeur het openbare hervorming in drie kategorieë verdeel, te wete nuwe 
regeringsbestuur, regulatoriese regeringsbestuur en nuwe openbare bestuur. Op 
grond van ‟n analise van die teoretiese inligting, is ‟n lys van kwalifiserende kriteria – 
gerig op openbare hervorming – saamgestel. Die outeur het vervolgens op die 
Bederfbare Produkte Uitvoerbeheerraad (PPECB) gefokus – dit is ‟n statutêre 
liggaam wat as diensverskaffer vir die bederfbare produkte uitvoernywerheid en as 
‟n reguleerder namens die Suid-Afrikaanse regering optree. Die outeur het ‟n analise 
gedoen van die model waarop Suid-Afrikaanse bederfbare uitvoere gebaseer is en 
voorts die organisasie se geskiedenis, strategie, operasionele struktuur en sy 
verhouding met die regering bestudeer. Die inligting wat ingewin is, is vervolgens 
met die lys van kwalifiserende kriteria – gerig op openbare hervorming – vergelyk. 
 
Daar is bevind dat die model – en spesifiek diensleweringstrategie by die PPECB – 
voldoende bewys lewer van nuwe regeringsbestuur, regulatoriese regeringsbestuur 
en nuwe openbare bestuur. Daar is ook bevind dat die model ‟n hibridisering is 
tussen tradisionele openbare administrasie en openbare hervorming aangesien dit 
karaktereienskappe van albei bevat. 
 
Die studie is in die vorm van ‟n literêre oorsig gedoen. Navorsing is uitgevoer deur 
die bestudering van verskeie geskrifte oor nuwe regeringsbestuur, regulatoriese 
regeringsbestuur en nuwe openbare bestuur. Daarbenewens het die outeur 
relevante inligting binne die PPECB, die Suid-Afrikaanse Departement van 
Landbou, Bosbou en Visserye en die uitvoernywerheid, ingesamel. Nog inligting is 
ook bekom deur ongestruktureerde onderhoude met senior werknemers van die 
PPECB te voer. 
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CHAPTER 1:  AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Public sector reform is in many cases misunderstood and regarded by some as a 
phenomenon that we will only experience in the future. However, as economic 
pressure on consumers mounts and the needs of society change, the load on public 
service sectors has increased significantly over the past few years. Government 
needed to adapt and expand the types of services they deliver in order to fulfil the 
ever-changing needs of citizens. 
 
It is reported that as early as 1980 (Batley & Larbi, 2004:31) services delivered by 
government came under attack for not keeping up with the demands of society. The 
Weberian model of bureaucracy was criticised for being too slow, ineffective and 
unresponsive. This led to the investigation of alternative methods to manage the 
public sector. Public sector reform therefore entails the transformation of the public 
services sector in order to meet the needs of society. Public sector reform is 
characterised by the use of unconventional methods, compared to traditional public 
administration, in order to deliver a more effective, efficient and responsive public 
service. Methods used are often synonymous with the private profit sector and can 
vary from the involvement of third party actors, outsourcing and the promotion of 
competition, amongst other things. Public sector reform appears to be more 
common in developed countries, with well established infrastructures and a mature 
political regime. With a few exceptions, it is often assumed that public sector reform, 
or at least certain aspects thereof, may be more challenging in developing countries, 
vis-à-vis their developed counterparts (Ogus 2005:161).` 
 
This research study takes a look at the basic principles of public sector reform. The 
researcher divides public sector reform into three categories: new governance, 
regulatory governance and new pubic management. Each of these categories is 
analysed theoretically and then summarised to generate a list of qualifying criteria 
against which public sector reform can be measured.  
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The researcher explores the South African agricultural environment and how it 
developed over time. The focus then shifts to the functioning of the South African 
export industry, specifically the export of perishable products.  
 
It is reported that about 25 percent of South African goods and services are 
exported (Roux, 2002: 93), of which perishable exports make out a massive 
R7 billion (PPECB Export Directory, 2006: 1-2). Given the relatively high turnover of 
this particular industry, it can be assumed that the industry is established and 
probably successful. The South African export industry is regulated by the 
government. It should be stated, however, that the government does not regulate 
the service directly, but make use of an organisation outside of government to do so. 
 
With reference to schedule 4, part A of the Constitution of South Africa (108 of 
1996), the responsibility for trade is a national and provincial legislative competence. 
Although the Constitution does not elaborate on the definition, “trade” is defined by 
Collins (1988:851) as the activity of buying, selling or exchanging goods or services. 
The export of perishable cargo can certainly be included as part of this definition. It 
can thus be argued that trade is ultimately a government responsibility, including the 
export of perishable cargo. In South Africa as a developing country, the regulation of 
the perishable export industry is done by the Perishable Export Control Board, and 
this has been the case for a number of years.  
 
The Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB) was formally founded in 
1926 and has since played a pivotal and influential role in ensuring the orderly 
exports of perishable cargo (De Beer et al., 2003:12-13). The PPECB is a statutory 
organisation, established in terms of the Perishable Export Control Board Act (9 of 
1983), and is South Africa‟s official authority (mandated by the Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) to deliver quality inspections (in terms of the 
Agricultural Product Standards Act, 119 of 1990) and Cold Chain Services to the 
perishable products industries within South Africa. In short, this merely means that 
perishable cargo may not be exported without any involvement of, or consent from, 
the PPECB. The core services delivered by the PPECB include quality inspections 
and cold-chain management, amongst other things. There is no doubt that the 
services as stipulated above are intended to ensure that only good quality products 
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with uniform standards are exported. Through delivering these services, the ultimate 
goal is to create international confidence in South African produce and thereby 
ensuring sustainable exports – typically what every government would want.  
 
In 1997 the PPECB underwent a process of deregulation, and lost its grip on many 
of the services they were initially mandated by legislation to deliver. Most of these 
services and responsibilities were absorbed by the industry. As a result of this, the 
export industry needed to get re-organised and accept responsibility for services 
previously taken care of by the PPECB. It is therefore important that such industry 
bodies need to have a close working relationship with the PPECB.  
 
Being a parastatal and service provider to the industry, the PPECB constantly finds 
itself in between being a mandated regulator of perishable exports and independent 
service provider to the industry. The challenge faced is to ensure proper quality 
control of export produce, without being a stumbling block to the export industry. As 
the PPECB operates within a changing and fairly business- and client-orientated 
environment, the success of such an organisation is certainly greatly dependent on 
how it adapts to change, but even more so, on the management style and approach 
adopted by the organisation.  
 
The researcher explores how the PPECB was established and how the organisation 
operates, and analyses the business model of the organisation. The study also 
reflects how agriculture and exports developed over time as well as the major 
changes that took place. 
 
1.2 Research problem and objective 
 
As mentioned before, the PPECB has a statutory function and is by definition a 
parastatal. The organisation is instituted in terms of the PPECB Act and in addition 
acts on behalf of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), 
carrying the responsibility of ensuring orderly exports. Having said this, and with 
specific reference to the roles and functions performed by the PPECB, as well as 
the organisation‟s relationship with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
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Fisheries, the question should be asked whether this model has any resemblances 
to the features of public sector reform.  
The researcher will therefore use data reviewed or collected to determine if this 
specific arrangement or model can be regarded as evidence of public sector reform 
in South Africa, using the PPECB as case study organisation. The focus will be on 
the services delivered by the PPECB on behalf of government, particularly the 
methods used to deliver these services, and the structural model that the 
relationship and delivery of services is built on in order to ensure the effective 
functioning of the service. 
 
1.3  Research design 
 
The study has drawn on existing data and will take the form of a literature review. It 
is therefore a non-empirical study design. 
 
The data needed to reach the desired outcome are mostly factual and have been 
derived from an in-depth analysis of relevant documentation and literature. The 
ground principles of the study have been based on the gathering of relevant 
literature pertaining to public sector reform, divided into the categories of new 
governance, regulatory governance and NPM, and its prevalence in developing 
countries. The researcher also gathered relevant information in the form of 
documentation from within the PPECB and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, (DAFF). Data was collected from both internal (PPECB) and from 
external (DAFF and other relevant sources). This method of studying / collecting 
data has ensured that the views of more than one party were taken into account, 
minimising the possibility of a one-sided approach by the researcher or any of the 
parties involved.  
 
The collection of data was limited to data that are documented. However, much of 
the information needed has not been documented, but was regarded as important 
for the purpose of this study. For this reason the researcher has selected senior 
employees within the PPECB, who were personally interviewed to elaborate on such 
information. It should be stated, however, that personal interviews were limited in 
order to keep the study as factual as possible. Interviews were also not intended to 
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collect new data, but to ensure that critical information and/or documentation has 
been interpreted correctly. Interviews took the form of a discussion and unstructured 
questionnaires were used.  
 
1.4. Research methodology 
 
To allow the researcher to develop a thorough understanding of public sector 
reform, the relevant literature on new governance, regulatory governance and NPM 
was studied and analysed as baseline information. This has assisted the researcher 
to acquire a proper understanding of the general principles of public sector reform in 
a global context. The study was then narrowed down to ascertaining the prevalence 
of public sector reform in developing countries, including South Africa. A list of 
qualifying criteria (as referred to above) was compiled using this theoretical 
information. 
 
Relevant documentation, policy frameworks and legislation within a South African 
context were studied and analysed. The study looked at the South African political 
arena and the prevalence of public sector reform in a political context. The focus of 
the study then shifts to the PPECB, and reflects on the establishment of the 
organisation, the relationship with the DAFF and the way the PPECB conducts its 
business.  
 
As an outcome, the researcher notes the information gathered on the services 
delivered by the PPECB, the methods the organisation uses and the involvement of 
the DAFF. This information is then compared to the list of qualifying criteria to 
determine whether there is any correspondence.  
 
Amongst other documents, the following internal and external documentation was 
studied and analysed to note the work done by the PPECB: 
- Strategic documentation 
- Annual organisational reports 
- Relevant legislation 
- Industry directories and publications 
- Documentation published on the official websites of the PPECB and the DAFF. 
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In order to ensure the correct understanding of certain terminology used throughout 
the study, the researcher has listed and defined these terms below. 
 
1.5. Conceptualisation 
 
This study refers regularly to specific terminology. It is important that such terms are 
clearly defined in order to put the research study into the correct context. 
 
 Efficient – refers to the optimal use of scarce resources and often include 
drivers like value for money (Schwella et al., 1996:17); 
 
 Responsive – means to take note of something and react appropriately 
(Collins, 1988:678); Kruger et al (2005:56) elaborates on this and define 
responsiveness as the ability to adjust as quickly as possible to any true 
changes in demand level. 
 
 Re-inventing government – the latest manifestation of the progressive 
tradition of continuously improving government (Shafritz & Russell, 2005: 
545); 
 
 Re-engineering – the fundamental rethinking and redesign of 
organisational processes to achieve significant improvements in critical 
measures of performance, such as costs and quality of services (Shafritz 
& Russell, 2005:545); 
 
 Deregulation – to free an organisation or industry from regulation (Encarta 
Reference Library, 2002). Craythorne (1993:499) defines deregulation as 
the removal of obstacles to economic growth and progress caused by the 
existence of unnecessarily restrictive legislation or policies. 
 
 Public Administration – that system of structures and processes, operating 
within a particular society as environment, with the objective of facilitating 
the formulation of appropriate governmental policy, and the efficient 
execution of the formulated policy (Fox et al., 1991:2). 
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
It is said that the traditional approach to solving public problems is no longer 
effective. The Weberian model of bureaucracy had already come under 
attack during the 1980s and was described as slow, insufficient, ineffective 
and unresponsive to service users (Batley & Larbi, 2004:31).  In simple 
language this means that government was just not functioning well anymore 
and this called for their approach to be revisited. This set the stage for a 
worldwide outcry for public sector reform. Salamon (2002:1) states that even 
defenders of government admit that the wrong kind of government is used to 
address current needs. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to explore the 
theoretical framework of public sector reform under the umbrella of new 
governance. The focus will then shift to regulatory governance as a 
mechanism of control, and new pubic management (NPM) as a substitute for 
traditional public administration. In addition, this chapter highlights 
advantages and possible problems, and outlines the focal points of these 
approaches. In conclusion, the researcher will develop a list of evaluative 
criteria based on the theoretical information gathered in this chapter.  
 
2.2  Governance 
  
In order to understand the concept of new governance, it is important to 
define the term „governance‟.  Rhodes (2002:208) implies that the term 
governance is popular but imprecise, with several distinct meanings.  He 
stipulates that governance refers to self-organising, inter-organisational 
networks and argues that these particular networks complement markets and 
hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources 
and exercising control and co-operation.  Frederickson (as cited in Ferlie et 
al., 2005:282) defines governance as the regimes, laws, rules, judicial 
decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe and enable 
the provision of publicly supported goals and services.  Goodin (as cited in 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000:11) in turn says that governance is nothing less 
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than the steering of society by officials in control of what are organisationally 
the commanding heights of society.   
 
Rhodes (2002:208) goes further and concludes that the current use of the 
term governance does not treat governance as a synonym for government.  
Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government by referring to 
a new process, a change in conditions of ordered rule or simply new methods 
by which society is governed. 
 
Rhodes adds that there are at least six separate uses of the concept of 
governance, of which governance as new pubic management (NPM) is only 
one.  He argues that steering constitutes a central part of the analysis of NPM 
and that steering is a synonym for governance (Rhodes, 2002:211).  It is 
clear that governance signifies change and proper co-ordination of a changed 
condition.  Governance leans more towards the sphere of policy decision 
making (steering) than delivering the actual service (rowing).  
 
2.3 New governance 
 
In the previous section we noted that the term governance has a lot of 
different meanings, but they all boil down to change in order or rule to meet 
the current needs.  Needs change over time and government needs to adapt.  
Salamon (2002:2) argues that earlier government activity was largely 
restricted to the direct delivery of goods or services; it now embraces 
providing loans, loan guarantees, grants, contracts and economic regulation.  
Services delivered by government have become more diverse over time and 
involve many more stakeholders than in the past. Salamon (2002:2) adds that 
the situation is complicated by the fact that each of these “tools” has its own 
operating procedures, skill requirements and delivery mechanisms.  He adds 
that new government services are not simply the delegation of clearly defined 
duties to regulated agents of the state, but sometimes involve third party 
actors for governmental functions.  These third party actors were at times left 
alone and allowed to make crucial decisions on behalf of government. These 
agencies spend government money at their own discretion and in many 
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instances become known as the “face” of government.  Although duly 
authorised, these agencies must be managed, as government remains the 
responsible authority. 
 
2.3.1 The need for new governance 
 
Salamon (2002:8) is of the opinion that in order to accommodate new 
governance, government does not need to be reinvented.  He says that the 
process of reinvention is already well advanced.  According to Salamon 
(2002:8), the greatest challenge is to manage the reinvented government. 
 
With the introduction of new governance, third party actors have entered the 
public domain, thus requiring a different approach from government.  It is said 
that new governance is recognised for its collaborative nature and its reliance 
on an array of third parties to solve public problems and pursue public 
purpose (Salamon, 2002:8). Smismans (2006:4) adds that new governance is 
characterised by heterophy rather than hierarchy, creating horizontal modes 
of governance among a multitude of actors, public and private, involving all 
relevant stakeholders.  This definitely creates a more participatory 
environment and a platform to address problems that have become far too 
complex for government to manage on its own.  Salamon (2002:9) 
distinguishes between classical public administration and new governance 
based on the following five key concepts. 
 
Table 2.1:  The New Governance Paradigm 
 Classical Public Administration New Governance 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Programme / Agency 
Hierarchy 
Public vs. Private 
Command and Control 
Management Skills 
Tool 
Network 
Public + Private 
Negotiation and Persuasion 
Enablement skills 
Source: Salamon (2002:9) 
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(a) From programme / agency to tool 
 
At the heart of new governance is the shift in the unit of analysis from public 
agency or individual public programmes to distinctive tools or instruments 
through which public purposes are pursued.  Salamon (2002:10) explains that 
new governance does not see programmes as unique, but finds certain 
commonalities in the tools that these public actions employ.  He argues that 
government programmes embody a limited number of basic tools or 
instruments that share common features, regardless of the field they are 
developed in.  These tools will eventually define the set of actors that will 
form part of the implementation process. These tools have different 
characteristics which will need specific management skills.  
 
(b) From hierarchy to network  
 
One of the most defining characteristics of tools is their indirect character, the 
establishment of interdependencies between public agencies and a host of 
third party actors (Salamon, 2002:11).  Frederickson (as cited in Ferlie et al., 
2005:283) notes that organisations that want to get things done, will no longer 
be hierarchical pyramids but systems with interlaced webs of tension in which 
control is loose, power diffused, and cent`res of decision plural.  The 
involvement of third parties introduces government to even more allies, but 
compromises government‟s position to exert complete control over its own 
programmes.  Government now shares responsibility with an array of third 
party actors, ranging from hospitals, corporations and banks – thus leaving 
government with no choice but to establish close networks with those 
different role-players. Salamon (2002:12) adds that this broadening focus 
does not only differentiate new governance from traditional public 
administration, but also from privatisation and from reinventing government. 
He argues that, although both of these schools acknowledge the importance 
of indirect government, in neither case is the use of third parties viewed as 
problematic.  Privatisation theories indicate that the private sector is more 
reliant on serving the public interest than public agencies are.  The 
reinvention school, of which NPM is a part, believes that contracting out and 
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other means of indirect government should be left to continue, without 
participation from public managers.  New governance, on the other hand, 
focuses much more on the internal working of public organisations vis-à-vis 
the networks of actors they rely on.  New governance acknowledges the 
advantages of such networks, as well as the challenges they may pose. 
 
(c) From public vs. private to public plus private 
 
Traditional public administration posits a definite tension between the public 
and the private sectors.  The public sector is distinguished by its monopoly 
and its legitimate mandate to act on behalf of the people (Salamon 2002:14).  
According to Salamon (2002:14), public systems have been designed to 
respond to the public will and not to the need of some private groups.  In the 
view of traditional public administration, it was therefore best to keep private 
interests and organisations at arm‟s length. 
 
The divide between the public and private sectors can also be identified in 
privatisation theories.  In this instance, it is about the protection of the private 
sector from intrusion of the state. 
 
According to Salamon (2002:14), the introduction of new tools of public action 
led to a blend between the public and private sector, instead of a division. 
Frederickson (as cited in Ferlie et al., 2005:283) notes the blurring of 
distinctions between public and private organisations and associates this 
blurring with the conception of governance.  New governance calls for 
collaboration to replace competition between these two sectors.  The two 
sectors should be combined, bringing to the table what each sector does best 
– government for securing important resources and the private sector for 
delivering services and innovation in new fields. 
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(d) From command and control to negotiation and persuasion 
 
Salamon (2002:15) argues that traditional public administration emphasises 
command and control as the modus operandi of public programmes.  This 
means that public agencies operate in a structured and bureaucratic 
environment with a relatively strict chain of command.  Traditional public 
administration is in many instances preoccupied with the clarification of lines 
of control and centralising authority – sometimes taking up valuable time that 
could have been spent differently. 
 
Privatisation, on the other hand, highlights the market as mechanism to 
achieve coordination and pursue public goals.  The focus is on market 
competition as a replacement for public decision making, shifting aside the 
need for further administrative control. 
 
New governance, in contrast, rejects both of the above approaches that imply 
private markets cannot be relied upon to serve public interests above those of 
the private sector.  The relationship between government and private sector 
requires continuous involvement from government to ensure that both parties 
are still on track.  New governance acknowledges that command and control 
are not the appropriate approach in the kind of network relationship that 
currently exists between government and its allies.  Instead, new governance 
proposes negotiation and persuasion as a preferred management approach.  
It is said that government is not in a position to enforce its will onto others and 
needs to learn how to create incentives in order to reach desired outcomes. 
 
(e) From management skills to enablement skills 
 
According to Salamon (2002:16), the shift in emphasis from command and 
control to persuasion and negotiation necessitated a different set of skills to 
manage the phenomenon of third-party government.  Both traditional public 
administration and NPM focus on management skills as the core.   
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New governance, on the other hand, shifts the emphasis from management 
to enablement skills.  In order to elaborate further on these enablement skills, 
Salamon (2002:16) highlights the four types of skills. 
 
Activation skills – these skills are required by new governance to activate 
the networks of actors that will be needed to address public problems.  
Although opportunities are continuously created for third parties to participate 
in government, these parties must be encouraged and mobilised to become 
active in their role as a partner to government.  On the question of individual 
accountability, Frederickson (as cited in Ferlie et al., 2005:2) argues that the 
new style public-private horizontal systems will be led by a new breed of men 
and women – people who will manage public responsibilities whether in 
public or private organisations.  
 
Orchestration skills – when all players/networks have been activated, new 
governance highlights the sustainability of this condition.  Orchestration skills 
deal with directing activities to such an extent that they produce the required 
outcome – a specific activity at a specific time.  Salamon (2002:17) compares 
orchestration skills with the way in which a conductor conduct a symphony 
orchestra. Orchestration skills will ensure that the relevant role-players 
remain on board, that the relevant resources are available and that the 
projects/programmes are in line with the objectives. 
 
Modulation skills – New governance introduces the modulation of rewards 
and penalties as methods to stimulate co-operation from players involved in 
the network.  Salamon (2002:17) refers to this as „enoughmanship‟.  Subsidy 
provided by developers/government must be sufficient to attract investment in 
rundown areas, but not to such an extent that it produces windfall profits.  It is 
said that people will generally not cooperate, unless they have a good reason 
for doing so (Kotze, 1997:41). 
 
Application of penalties and rewards should be well balanced, otherwise 
players may withdraw, or public goals are completely disregarded. Salamon 
(2002:17) argues that regulatory enforcement may be more successful if it 
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promotes the concept of “good inspector” as opposed to “tough cop”.  They 
add that the “good inspector” usually understands that patience, discretion 
and tact rather than rigid enforcement best achieve regulatory compliance. 
 
New governance focuses on the broadening of discretion and in developing 
of the skills needed to exercise such discretion that will ultimately advance 
programme objectives.  
 
2.4 Regulatory governance 
  
In a dispensation where government makes use of unconventional methods 
and strategies to structure its business, the deployment of proper controls is 
essential.  It is said that distortion of law or rules and corruption are closely 
linked (Du Plessis in Gildenhuys, 1991:21) - meaning that such laws or rules 
should be clear and well understood to avoid any malpractice.  In terms of 
NPM and new governance, authority may be decentralised, involving an array 
of non-government actors.  Government may on many occasions be 
distanced from the actual service deliverers, hence the need for a regulated 
environment. 
 
2.4.1 The definition of regulatory governance 
 
Governance was defined in the previous section as signifying a new process, 
a change in condition of ordered rule, or simply new methods by which 
society is governed (Rhodes, 2002:208).  Regulation is defined as the control 
of an activity or process by means of rules (Collins, 1988:666).  If we go a 
step further, regulations are defined as rules which try to control human 
behaviour (CRC Policy Brief, 2004:2).  We can therefore say that regulatory 
governance is the framework established in order to exercise control over the 
new methods used to govern society. 
 
Sharfritz and Russell (2005:13) add that regulation is basically the 
government telling citizens and business what they may and may not do – 
controlling their actions and behaviour. 
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2.4.2 The need for regulation 
 
Regulation can be called upon for more reasons than one.  Amongst the most 
common are to ensure certain standards; enforce uniform standards; create 
law and order; and guide actions and activities to reach specific outcomes.  
According to Sharfritz and Russell (2005:14), the more crowded and 
economically developed an environment is, the more regulations can be 
found – very ironic, as one would expect a greater sense of self-control with 
economic development.  They argue that regulation may minimise or prevent 
people from bumping into each other‟s cars; prevent the building of 
structurally unsound houses; and even prevent/minimise incidents of food 
poisoning.  Such incidents were fairly common but became less as society 
became more regulated.  Ogus (2005:146) states that regulation involves 
individuals and firms being induced to achieve outcomes that, in absence of 
the instrument, they would not have attained. 
 
2.4.3 Methods of regulation 
 
Modern-day regulation is so common that we adhere to it without any 
objection.  Sharfritz and Russell (2005:13) say that we are regulated from: 
 
The day of birth (birth certificate); building a house (building 
regulations); driving a car (driver‟s license); getting married (marriage 
license); even till the day we die (death certificate). It is therefore a fact 
that our lives are continuously governed by some form of regulation. 
 
One form of regulation relates to how the state continues to control activities 
that have been privatised.  Another relates to how the NPM reforms are 
designed and implemented (CRC Policy Brief, 2 of 2004).  The latter reforms 
are supposed to eliminate politics from management and ensure institutional 
autonomy. 
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2.4.4 Regulatory systems 
 
According to Ogus (2005:150), regulatory systems must be enforced and this 
requires some agency to do so.  He identifies four main agency types: 
 
(a) The agency that is part of government.  The agency may turn to the 
outside for opinions, but the rules and final decision are made within 
government. 
 
(b) An agency that is semi-autonomous – this agency is independent and not 
accountable to government.  However, government exerts some control, 
through one or more of the following: 
 The appointment of members; 
 Government representation; 
 Rules and decisions must be made in accordance with government policy 
or guidelines; 
 Ratification of decisions by relevant ministers. 
 
(c) An agency that is independent of government.  Few, if any, of the controls 
stipulated in the previous agency types exist.  This type of agency is a public 
institution, acting under powers conferred through, and in accordance with, 
principles enacted by the legislative.  Members of this agency are experts 
recruited from non-government sources without political affiliations. 
 
(d) An agency that is self-regulatory and independent from government. A 
significant proportion of the agency members are drawn to represent their 
respective regulated sectors.  However, some degree of public control may 
be exercised through one or more of the following: 
 Some members to represent public interest; 
 Principles and procedures followed are determined by the legislature; 
 Agency rules and decisions may be challenged by reference to courts or a 
superior public agency. 
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2.4.5 Advantages 
 
Ogus (2005:151) states that the delegation of regulatory rulemaking to 
agencies independent of government has several advantages.  
 
Distance from government can reduce the degree of political interference.  
Decisions are made outside of government and in most instances solely 
based on the facts. 
 
Expertise of members can be concentrated in ways that are not always 
possible within government.  Being outside of government, members usually 
experience less or even no political interference and can therefore remain 
focused by expending their energy on the actual tasks. 
 
Ogus (2005:151) also acknowledges the involvement of government in some 
instances, for example, Agency Type (b). Although there has been a great 
tendency towards deregulation over the past three decades, government still 
needs to keep a firm hand on certain decisions or policies.  The latter are 
normally decisions or policies of public interest. 
 
2.4.6 Regulatory governance in South Africa 
 
The democratisation of South Africa in 1994 set the tone for regulatory 
systems. According to Müller (2004:237), parliament was considered to be 
sovereign before the new dispensation.  The new South African Constitution 
(108 of 1996) makes provision for, amongst other things, the establishment of 
regulatory authorities. 
 
Regulatory governance has become fairly common in the South African 
government structures ever since then.  Industries and professional bodies 
have over time geared themselves to this and mostly take full responsibility to 
regulate.  Examples are the Ombudsman for the banking industry; the Health 
Professionals Council of South Africa; and Agri-Inspec, which oversees the 
importation of agricultural products.  Although these bodies are in most cases 
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independent from government, they fulfil major regulatory roles, previously 
performed by government departments. By doing so, these bodies ease the 
load on government. 
 
2.5 New public management 
 
New public management (NPM) has been around as a concept since the 
early 1970s and developed as a substitute for traditional public 
administration. For the purpose of this study, NPM is regarded as one of the 
concepts in striving towards a new governance.  In relation to the principles of 
new governance, NPM is much more concerned with the structural, 
managerial and organisational changes of government reform (Batley & 
Larbi, 2004: 41). 
 
2.5.1 The definition of NPM 
 
NPM introduces unfamiliar concepts such as competition, value for money, 
decentralisation, a closer focus on quality and feedback from clients, and 
professional management, amongst other things, to the public sector arena.  
NPM is best defined as being a set of particular management approaches 
and techniques borrowed from the private-for-profit sector and applied in the 
public sector (Batley & Larbi, 2004:41) 
 
Applying private sector techniques does not merely mean the privatisation or 
outsourcing of state assets as the name may imply, but actually goes far 
beyond that.  NPM explores possibilities such as service contracts, public-
private partnerships (PPPs), long-term concessions, all in the search for 
affordable but effective service delivery.  Hood (1991:5) is of the opinion that 
rivalry may be the key to lower costs and better standards. 
 
Although the phenomenon of a new approach to public management is not 
entirely new, it is still widely criticised.  According to Batley and Larbi 
(2004:40), traditional public administration cannot easily be replaced by NPM.  
They argue that certain qualities such as stability and predictability will 
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survive this transformation.  Burger (2005:4) goes further by stating that the 
competitive environment of NPM often results in a scenario where service 
providers only focus on required outputs and ignore the importance of the 
service to be delivered.  He further adds that NPM assumes that highly 
professional managers are in total control of their respective business units 
and that service payers/clients are kept at a safe distance after they have 
paid their extravagant fees (2005:3).  
 
NPM is described as being a more holistic challenge to traditional 
administration (Batley & Larbi, 2004:40).  It is also said that the NPM model is 
comprehensive but tailored for the developed countries (Minogue, 1988:33).  
However, Minogue (1988:34) notes that the model should be flexible and able 
to adapt to different administrative and political contexts – meaning that  
irrespective of the government structure NPM should be able to provide the 
answer.  
 
In the early 1990s traditional public administration was diagnosed as being 
too rigid and consequently too unresponsive to meet the changing demands 
of the public sector (Batley & Larbi, 2004:39).  NPM held the promise of 
dealing with these demands by simply adapting private sector techniques and 
making them work for the public sector. One of the main objectives of NPM is 
to improve the delivery of public services (Oxford Policy Institute, 2000:1). 
 
According to McLaughlin et al. (2002:211), NPM relates to the notion of re-
engineering the public sector or reinventing of government.  They add that it 
calls for changes in the structure of public organisations, their culture, 
management systems and other aspects in support of the new initiative.  This 
implies that government needs to adopt an unconventional approach. 
 
Burger (2005:3-4) says that NPM is a numbers game and compares it with F1 
racing – non-performance will ultimately lead to the termination of service 
contracts.   
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It is important to note that NPM is focused on outcomes in contrast to 
traditional public administration, which is more focused on internal processes. 
Hood (1991:4) adds that NPM has a great emphasis on results rather than 
procedures.  Service providers are therefore under constant pressure to 
deliver the desired outputs and kept up to speed by the possibility that their 
contracts may be terminated if they are not able to do so. 
 
NPM therefore creates a competitive environment, forcing service providers 
to be more responsive, effective and efficient through a constant process of 
reforming. 
 
2.5.2 NPM in practice 
 
It is quite clear that the ultimate goal of NPM is to make government services 
more affordable, efficient, effective and user friendly, but still ensure proper 
control.  NPM holds the promise of adopting a more hands-on approach, 
measures performance, be closer to the customer/client, managing by results 
and ensure greater competition through outsourcing (Rhodes, 2002:211).  
Having said this, Rhodes (2002) is of the opinion that government‟s role 
should be limited to policy decisions and that government‟s actual 
involvement should be minimised.  By implication governments should only 
give direction and create the framework for effective service delivery.  The 
delivery of services should be contracted out and the state must intervene 
only when members fail (Minogue, 1998:21).   
 
NPM also calls for managers to be hands-on and accountable. This means 
that managers should be visible and actively involved in organisations. For 
managers to be successful in doing this, it will require clear assignment of 
responsibility and not the diffusion of power (Hood, 1991:4). 
 
The following examples of structural changes in the public sector as a result 
of NPM are discussed by Minogue (1998:24-25). 
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The British government has restructured its public service to form 130 
freestanding agencies.  These agencies employ a total of 386 000 civil 
servants.  Each agency has its own chief executive officer.  These agencies 
and their executive officers will be measured against set criteria and will 
receive incentives based on their performance.  According to Minogue 
(1998), similar agencies were also formed in Canada and New Zealand. 
 
The establishment of these agencies is a clear sign that government services 
in these countries have become more decentralised.  This gives managers 
more authority and creates the opportunity to be more responsive to the 
customers‟ needs.  According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:86), the ideal 
public sector agency must be flat, flexible, specialised/focused, decentralised 
and probably relatively small.  They also mention that the trend of public 
sector reform is to do away with large bureaucracies, as they represent the 
“Old World”. Therefore Minogue (1998:24) notes that successful 
organisations produce a small central core overseeing a flatter fragmented 
structure.  They mention that these structures are known to be more 
responsive to external forces and changes as they facilitate a more 
professional organisational culture and encourage entrepreneurialism. 
 
Pieterse (2002:8) sums up typical NPM approaches to promote the following: 
 The adoption of strategically planned techniques to develop frameworks 
to guide allocation of certain resources; 
 Improving performance through the introduction of incentives and 
sanctions; 
 Allow managers to use their discretion through the reduction of rules – a 
process of deregulation; 
 The adoption and utilisation of contracts for lines of responsibility and 
accountability; 
 Privatisation of public services to improve service quality and coverage; 
 Entering into public-private partnership agreements if full-scale 
privatisation is not viable; 
 The introduction, whenever possible, of competition between agencies 
and even departments within the public sector; 
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 Reducing the public sector wage bill through restructuring; 
 The elimination of all service subsidies and search for the recovery of all 
service costs. 
 
Pieterse (2002:8) is of the opinion that the persuasive power of NPM lies in 
the fact that it promises greater efficiency and reduced political risk, because 
many responsibilities are shifted to other sectors. 
 
2.5.3 NPM and developing countries 
 
Governments in developing countries are often characterised by huge and 
clumsy public sectors, which are unresponsive and place little emphasis on 
outputs or outcomes (Luwaga, 2003:8-9).  It is therefore unusual to note that 
certain developing countries such as Jamaica, Ghana and Uganda are 
implementing certain principles unique to NPM (according to Talbot and 
others as quoted by Batley & Larbi, 2004:45).  Studies have shown that the 
establishment of service agencies is fairly common in these countries.  It is 
also said that a significant increase in revenue can be noted after the 
implementation of revenue-collection agencies. 
 
According to McLaughlin et al. (2002:213), significant efforts towards reform 
and transformation of the public sector have been made in sub-Saharan 
Africa since the early 1980s.  It is argued that these efforts were prompted by 
underperformance, and a lack of accountability in African bureaucracies. 
 
It is clear that, although attempts to implement NPM in some developing 
countries have been made, there is still a long way ahead.  Control in many 
of these countries is still centralised, allowing little or no authority to manage 
freely. 
 
2.5.4 NPM in South Africa 
 
Although a developing country, South Africa is a well-respected member of 
the international community (Sonn, 2000:45). The South African government 
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has rightfully earned this position after more than four decades of racial 
oppression.  With apartheid abolished the road of reconstruction and 
development lies ahead. 
 
NPM is not an unfamiliar concept to the South African government.  Going 
back all the way to 1955, one of the main building blocks of our democratic 
Constitution (108 of 1996) was indeed the Freedom Charter.  The Freedom 
Charter was written in 1955 by the ANC (African National Congress) in co-
operation with anti-apartheid groups to express their goals and objectives for 
a free South Africa.  Being a progressive document, one of the ten 
propositions in this document was that “The People shall Govern” (Encarta 
Reference Library, 2002; African National Congress, 1955). 
 
In the State of the Nation Address on 15 February 2005 the ex-Minister 
Geraldine Frazer Moleketi explained that under the heading of “The People 
shall Govern” (Build People‟s Power, 2005), the Freedom Charter asserted, 
amongst other things, that “all people shall be entitled to take part in the 
administration of the country” (Frazer Moleketi, 2005:1). 
The ex-minister says further that the needs of the people should give 
direction to the administration (Frazer Moleketi, 2005:2).  Although the 
honourable ex-minister does not spell it out clearly, this may implicate that 
government should be responsive to the needs of the population. 
 
This point touches on one of the ten principles of NPM as spelled out by 
Minogue (1998:18): “Steer the ship, rather than row it”.  As stated by ex-
Minister Frazer Moleketi, the South African government will allow the citizens 
to actively participate in government decisions in order to guide government 
to meet the needs of their citizens. The ex-Minister goes further by quoting 
Osborne and Gaebler, saying that business does some things better than 
government, but government does some things better than business (Frazer 
Moleketi, 2005:7). It is clear that the ex-Minister acknowledges the 
importance of private sector principles in government and vice versa and also 
acknowledged the fact that NPM and reinvented government have been 
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effective tools in improving the efficiency of the public sector and in reducing 
costs. 
 
Ex-Minister Geraldine Frazer Moleketi headed the Department of Public 
Service and Administration (DPSA) until 2008. As this is the Department that 
needs to ensure public service excellence, the DPSA touches on many 
aspects relating to NPM.  However, the challenge is the implementation of 
the already formulated policy documents. 
 
The mission of the DPSA is to -  
 Support the minister in leading public service administration; 
 Provide professional advice and support to ensure public service 
excellence; 
 Promote good governance nationally, on the African continent and 
globally (DPSA, 2007). 
 
In its value statements, the DPSA states that the statement is aligned with the 
Constitution and Batho Pele (People First) principles (DPSA, 2007). This 
department therefore ensures that it develops within the macro framework 
established by national government. When you refer to one of the Batho Pele 
principles nl. Value for money, it is exactly what NPM calls for (Meyer & 
Theron, 2000). This principle states that public services should be provided 
economically and efficiently. Being the department that oversees government 
service delivery, this statement sets the tone for other government 
departments not to create unnecessary service costs.  
 
The value statement includes, amongst other things, the following: 
 Utilising resources effectively and efficiently.  As with NPM, there is a 
clear focus on the effective and efficient utilisation of resources; 
 Encouraging citizens to participate in policymaking and implementation.  
The DPSA thus acknowledges the importance of stakeholder participation 
in order to address their needs. 
 
25 
 
Furthermore, the DPSA introduced a new management framework in July 
1999, to ensure improved service delivery in the public service 
departments/institutions (DPSA, 2007).  This includes, but is not limited to: 
 
 Continuously auditing the progress achieved by the departments in 
complying with the dictates of the new management framework. 
This is to ensure compliance with relevant targets.  Continuous 
auditing will not only prevent possible problems within a 
department, but also ensure that the department keeps in touch 
with its mission.  Minogue (1998:18) goes further by saying that 
regular auditing may even improve efficiency. 
 
 A performance management system (through performance 
agreement) that is supported by a competency framework. 
Minogue (1998:18) as well as Pieterse (2002:8) regard a 
performance management system as one of the important 
principles of NPM.  Minogue (1998:18) argues that NPM focuses 
on funding the outcome rather than the need. Government 
departments sometimes create the impression that their outcomes 
are medium to long term, and therefore cannot be measured. It is 
maybe for this reason that some government officials cannot 
produce definite results, making their existence questionable by 
the broader public. With the introduction of a performance 
management system, officials and ultimately departments can be 
measured on outcomes, provided that the performance 
management system functions correctly.  If the DPSA implies that 
they want to provide value for money, the public (being the client) 
does have a right to know how their money was spend, to 
determine whether it was a fair value exchange.  
 
2.5.5 Problems with the NPM approach 
 
Batley and Larbi (2004:41) sum NPM up as a set of particular management 
approaches and techniques borrowed from the private sector and applied in 
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the public sector.  Although it sounds fairly simple and straightforward, NPM 
has been criticised for almost as long as it has been around. Rhodes 
(2002:218) draws our attention to four weaknesses of NPM, as pointed out by 
the advocates of the new governance. 
 
Firstly, he notes that managerialism, being one of the cornerstones of the 
NPM approach, adopts an intra-organisational approach.  Rhodes (2002) is 
of the opinion that this may be in order when managing line bureaucracies; 
but it does not accommodate the managing of inter-organisational links.  
Rhodes (2002) adds that it lacks the negotiation of shared purpose in the 
absence of hierarchy control.  
 
Secondly, Rhodes (2002:218) criticizes managerialism‟s obsessive 
preoccupation with management by objectives.  In an environment that 
involves different actors, the emphasis should shift to managing the 
relationship between these networks.  The preservation of trust should 
override all other considerations. 
 
Thirdly, NPM is fairly focused on results.  The introduction of third party 
actors to government creates an inter-organisational network, where a single 
actor is not responsible for an outcome.  Actors may differ on the desired 
outcome and how to measure performance, and the centre (the government) 
is in no position to enforce any preferences. Eventually many actors have 
contributed to the success of an enterprise and a single actor can therefore 
not be highlighted and not be held accountable after the event.  It is again 
pointed out that NPM may suit line bureaucracies, but does not 
accommodate inter-organisational networks.  These networks simply 
undermine NPM with its specific focus on objectives and results. 
 
Rhodes (2002) concludes by drawing attention to the distinct contradiction 
between competition and steering, which is at the heart of the NPM 
approach.  He argues that the low level of interdependence between several 
stakeholders and the resulting network leads to instability and lack of trust to 
develop a negotiated balance/equilibrium between these forces. The 
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introduction of markets and competition will therefore compound the problem 
of steering.  NPM lacks the focus to establish a relationship of trust between 
these diverse forces. 
 
Furthermore, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:174) add to the criticism of NPM by 
saying that NPM may distance political leaders from government problems.  
Political leaders may refer to government as if it is an alienated entity and go 
as far as to blame government for certain problems. By inviting third party 
actors to take part in government activities, political leaders may conveniently 
distance themselves when service delivery is not to the satisfaction of clients.  
They may use the arrangement as a scapegoat and act as if they are not 
accountable in any way. 
 
Burger (2005:40) criticises the NPM approach for creating fragmentation as a 
result of a lack of integrated vision.  He argues that NPM became so focused 
on outputs and results that it eventually lost track of the bigger picture.  
Burger adds that NPM assumes that clients/customers are independent with 
the right to choose and the ability to pay – the less fortunate individuals may 
therefore be marginalised.  This argument is supported by ex-Minister 
Geraldine Fraser Moleketi, (2002:5), who said that NPM calls for the 
decentralisation and devolution of power.  This may leave the state powerless 
in trying to correct extreme geographical differences, allowing disadvantages 
to continue. 
 
2.6 Qualifying criteria for public sector reform 
 
For the purpose of this study, the researcher summarised a list of criteria 
against which the phenomenon of public sector reform can be measured. The 
criteria will be based on theoretical information discussed so far. The criteria 
will be divided into the three main categories; new governance, regulatory 
governance and new pubic management. 
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Table 2.2: Criteria for public sector reform 
NEW GOVERNANCE 
 
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
(NPM) 
 Diversification of government 
services 
 The involvement of third party 
actors 
 Collaborative service delivery, 
involving public and private 
sector 
 Creation of horizontal modes of 
government by including a 
multitude of public and private 
actors 
 Establishment of close networks 
with third party role players 
 Activation and sustainability of 
these networks 
 No reliance on command and 
control, but negotiation and 
persuasion to reach goals 
 Introduction of rewards and 
penalties to stimulate co-
operation 
 No rigid enforcement, but 
patience, discretion and tact  
 
 Deployment of proper controls 
 Where government is distanced 
from a service or function they 
are accountable for, such 
service is delivered by a third 
party actor 
 The actions of a specific 
industry are controlled or guided 
by some form of policy or 
document 
 The use of one of the following 
regulatory agencies; 
 An agency which is part of 
government 
 An agency which is semi-
autonomous 
 An agency which is 
independent of government 
 An agency which is self-
regulatory and independent 
from government 
 
 Recognised by the promotion of 
competition and value for money  
 NPM has a strong focus on the 
quality of service and feedback 
from clients on service quality 
 Outcome driven 
 Hands-on approach 
 Measures performance 
 Maintains performance through 
incentives and sanctions 
 Allows services to be closer to the 
client through a process of 
deregulation 
 Do away with government 
subsidies and strive to recover all 
service costs 
 Belief that government should 
give direction and stand back to 
allow for participation 
 More concerned with the needs of 
its clients than that of the service 
provider itself 
 Use of service contracts and 
public-private partnerships to 
reduce service costs 
 Calls for responsive, effective and 
efficient service delivery 
Source: Compiled by author, 2008 
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2.7  Summary 
 
For many years traditional public administration was regarded as the 
cornerstone to address public needs around the globe. Over time, the 
traditional approach became slow, inefficient, costly and simply could not 
cope with the increasing, yet specific demands of public needs.  The model 
was faced with constant criticism and pressure rose to investigate the 
possibility of public sector reform. Public sector reform can come in different 
forms, of which only three are explored by the author.  
 
New governance, as a phenomenon of public sector reform, recognises the 
importance of third party actors entering the public domain to help solve 
public problems. Government services were restricted to service delivery in 
the past, but became so diverse over time that they now include a multitude 
of stakeholders.  New governance is known for its collaborative nature, the 
formation of networks and the unconventional methods used to sustain these 
networks in order to maintain good relationships between an array of public 
and private role-players. In theory, it is almost certain that the concept of new 
governance touches all the right aspects to establish a cooperative 
framework between private and public sector. The author is however of the 
opinion that the practical side thereof is much more challenging than literature 
may imply. Government bureaucracies have become so use to doing things 
their way, that it will be a mammoth task to make them believe otherwise. 
Furthermore, decisions made by such bureaucracies are usually politically 
motivated, and not always made to bring about the best possible outcome. 
Apart from external realities, the single biggest challenge faced by new 
governance is to change the principles on which decisions are based. 
Government should also learn to accept private role-players as a partner and 
not regard them as the enemy or competition.  
 
Another extension of public sector reform is regulatory governance.  The 
entering of non-governmental actors into the public domain may lead to a 
situation where government is distanced from the actual service that is 
delivered. Notwithstanding the latter situation, government remains 
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accountable and will therefore need a framework to ensure proper control. As 
a result of deregulation and privatisation, government makes use of 
regulations in order to referee the participants. It is said that regulation is so 
common that it has become unnoticeable in modern society. It should 
however be stated that such regulations should be clear and well 
communicated to avoid any misinterpretation. 
 
One of the most common means of regulation takes place by means of an 
agency. These agencies can range from being part of government, or be 
semi-autonomous, totally independent of government or self-regulatory 
agencies. Regulatory agencies are commonly found in South Africa, ranging 
from the health to the agricultural sector. In a developing country like South 
Africa, it is especially important that government keeps a close eye over 
certain developments. Coming from an era of oppression, government will 
want to ensure that certain imbalances created in the past do not re-occur 
and at the same time such imbalances are addressed. This situation makes 
the selection of agency types extremely difficult, as too much government 
involvement may create the impression that government wants to be in 
control.  
 
Lastly, public sector reform may appear in the form of new pubic 
management (NPM). NPM makes use of techniques and strategies 
commonly known in the private sector and introduces them to the public 
sector. These techniques include concepts such as competition, value for 
money and decentralisation, amongst other things. These techniques were 
adopted to make the public service more responsive, efficient and affordable.  
It should however be stated that the traditional public administration model 
have been around for ages, and should not be shifted aside all at once. 
Although it is said that the model is not as effective as it used to be, the 
model is simple, familiar and rooted in bureaucracies around the globe. The 
author is of the opinion that NPM will slowly make its way into government 
structures, although it is not sure if the traditional model of public 
administration will ever disappear totally. Although both models do have 
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some disadvantages, NPM seems to provide the right answers for the right 
time.  
 
NPM is not a new concept and has been around for more than thirty years. 
Evidence of NPM can be found in structures of developing countries such as 
Ghana, Jamaica, and even South Africa. 
 
Public sector reform is a relatively common phenomenon and has become 
part of government structures all over the world. The next chapter will explore 
public sector reform in a South African context, with specific reference to role-
players in the agricultural export sector. 
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CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
PERISHABLE EXPORT SECTOR, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE 
PERISHABLE PRODUCTS EXPORT CONTROL BOARD (PPECB) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Two focused on three categories, namely, new governance, 
regulatory governance and new pubic management (NPM) – all touching on 
unconventional strategies to handle government affairs.  The literature review 
revealed that, although these unconventional approaches were not very 
common in developing countries, some evidence of such models there could 
be found. In many instances evidence of unconventional governmental 
strategies is well embedded in government structures of some developing 
countries.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to review the changes that have taken place in 
the South African export sector since it became regulated. Then the focus will 
be shifted to the Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB), with 
reference to its inception, the organisational structure, strategies, relationship 
with government and its role within the export arena.  
 
3.2 A historical perspective on South African perishable exports 
  
Perishable products have been exported from South Africa since the early 
1600s and the process developed a rich history over time. Shortly after the 
establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, exports became regulated 
with the promulgation of the Uitvoer van Vruchten Wet, 12 of 1925 (De Beer 
et al., 2003: 34). This act stipulated the size, shape and packaging of fruit 
destined for export and was unique in the world. 
 
Ever since the inception of the above-mentioned legislation, the role of the 
state became prominent in the South African agriculture and export 
environment. In addition to the Uitvoer van Vruchten Wet, the Union of South 
Africa introduced an array of legislation, including the Marketing Act of 1937 
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(Vink & Kirsten, 2000).  It is said that the Marketing Act (1937) became the 
cornerstone of commercial agricultural policy and played a pivotal role in 
influencing access to markets for a selected group of farmers (Vink & Kirsten, 
2000).  
 
The Kassier Report (1992:6) revealed that the Marketing Act (1937) was the 
direct result of the deliberations of the Viljoen Committee appointed in the 
1934. The committee argued that state intervention was justified for the 
following reasons: 
 The inelastic demand for farm products; 
 The adverse climate in South Africa; 
 The lack of information; and 
 The risk inherent to a free market.  
 
Based on the above, the committee argued for mechanisms to ensure stable 
prices and allow surplus removal, hence the promulgation of the Marketing 
Act (1937). According to Kassier et al. (1992:7), large-scale state intervention 
in agriculture after the Great Depression was not restricted to South Africa, 
but was a worldwide trend during that time. However, what made the South 
African situation unique was the combination of the said intervention with the 
respective Land Acts of 1913 and 1926. Kassier et al. (1992: 8) summarise 
the end results of the state‟s intervention, which include the following: 
 An inequitable farm production structure, with great imbalances 
between commercial and subsistence farming, with respect to access 
to land and support services; 
 The ability to export surplus basic foods, even at a financial loss; 
 The development of a workable information system; 
 The development of a wide range of export markets in respect of a few 
selected commodities; 
 The prevalence of widespread poverty, malnutrition and hunger, 
especially in the rural areas; 
 A lack of food security; 
 A financial crisis among commercial farmers; 
 An inflexible infrastructure; and 
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 An output pricing policy biased in favour of producers. 
  
The combination of the promulgated legislation gave the state at the time the 
authority to control who gets to plant, who gets to export, the commodity to be 
exported as well as the condition of the produce to be exported. While many 
of these aspects were mainly controlled through access to land and funds, 
fruit destined for export was inspected by government inspectors around 
harbour areas (De Beer et al., 2003:34).  
 
The stringent regulation of the South African agricultural sector continued 
until the mid 1980s (Kleinhans, April 2008, personal interview). This was an 
era of a substantial shift in farming policy, which made the sector more 
exposed to market forces (Vink & Kirsten, 2000).  
 
3.3 The establishment of the PPECB 
 
In 1924 the South African government appointed the Lategan Committee to 
investigate and study practices regarding the export of fruit from South Africa. 
The committee submitted a report and recommended that a central authority 
to negotiate shipping space should be established. This authority should act 
in the interest of all farmers (De Beer et al., 2003:37). 
 
De Beer et al. (2003:38-41) point out that this report was eventually submitted 
to Parliament and in 1925 the Vruchten Uitvoer Kontrole Wet, 12 of 1925, 
was promulgated. This led to the establishment of the Vruchten Uitvoer 
Kontrole Raad, as recommended by the Lategan Committee. Towards the 
end of 1925 a number of farmers made other perishable products, apart from 
fruit, available for export. The Vruchten Uitvoer Kontrole Raad requested 
Parliament to extend the Board‟s mandate to include export regulation of 
export products. The request was granted and Parliament promulgated the 
Wet op Reeling van Uitvoer van Bederfbare Produkte, 53 of 1926. This lead 
to the creation of the Perishable Export Control Board in 1926. 
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The PPECB has played a pivotal and invaluable role in ensuring the orderly 
export of perishable cargo from South Africa ever since (De Beer et al., 
2003:9). The 1926 act was amended and substituted by the Perishable 
Products Export Control Board Act (Act 9 of 1983). The PPECB is a statutory 
organisation and is South Africa‟s official authority (mandated by the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) to deliver product quality 
inspections in terms of the Agricultural Product Standards Act (APS) (Act 119 
of 1990), and cold chain services to the perishable product industries within 
South Africa. Apart from the previously mentioned legislation, the PPECB‟s 
regulatory framework, as spelled out by section 10 of the PPECB Act (9 of 
1983), can be summarised as follows: 
 Control of the export shipment of perishable products from South Africa; 
 Determination of the suitability of ships; 
 Call exporters for intended volumes to be shipped; 
 Determine the amount of shipping space available on vessels for the 
shipment of perishable cargo; 
 Contact and/or arrange and negotiate the necessary port facilities and 
shipping space for handling perishable products; 
 Determine the most suitable port for the shipment of perishable products; 
 Investigate the conveyance and cold storage requirements for perishable 
products and make recommendations to any department of state or 
invested party; 
 Make recommendations on the way to handle perishable products when 
moved from and to railway trucks, other vehicles or cold stores; 
 Promote uniform freight rates for the export of perishable products; and 
 Perform such other functions in relation to the export of perishable 
products as may be prescribed by regulation. 
 
In a nutshell, the abovementioned legislation implies that perishable cargo 
may not be exported without the consent of the PPECB.  The core service 
categories are listed below (PPECB Export Directory, 2006:2-4). 
 Inspection services – the inspection of products based on legislative 
requirement or agreed standards in order to ensure optimum quality.  This 
is done through on-farm inspections or inspection prior to loading. 
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 Cold chain services – Temperature and equipment monitoring of products 
destined for export in order to ensure optimum quality and a prolonged 
shelf life.  Cold chain services include, but are not limited to: 
 Cold store and container depot registration; 
 Container inspections; 
 Vessel surveying; 
 Temperature management auditing; 
 Loading supervision; 
 Issuing of carrying instructions; 
 Research and development; 
 Recordkeeping; and 
 Administration. 
 Mycotoxin Analytical Programme – This programme deals with the 
performance of impartial mycotoxin analytical services according to 
international best practice.  This programme plays a pivotal role in 
ensuring good safety and thereby creating confidence in the South African 
perishable product market. 
 Official Food Safety Authority – In addition to the existing mandate, the 
PPECB was assigned as the official Food Safety Authority in May 2005 by 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF).  The 
objective of this programme is to ensure compliance to the auditing 
standards and Food Safety Standards, as listed under the Agricultural 
Product and Standards Act (Act 119 of 1990). 
 Certification Services – The PPECB also carries out third party audits and 
grants certificates for sustainable agricultural methods.  This section 
enjoys full accreditation status from the South African National 
Accreditation System (SANAS) and is able to grant accredited 
EUREPGAP and HACCP certificates that are internationally accepted. 
 Specialised Services – This programme monitors and measures risk in 
the supply chain on behalf of contracted clients. 
 Agency Services – The PPECB has been appointed to manage and 
implement the South African Perishable Initiative Programme (SAPIP).  
This programme aims to assist producers with compliance to European 
Union (EU) export requirements for food safety and consumer protection. 
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Based on the above list of services delivered by the PPECB, it should be 
stated clearly that only cold chain services, inspection services, and official 
food and safety authority forms part of the PPECB‟s statutory mandate.  The 
remainder of the listed services are delivered only on request from clients.  
 
3.4 Structure 
 
The PPECB is managed by a Board of Directors, representing different 
export groups and one member designated by the Minister (Section 4 of 
Perishable Products Export Control Act, Act 9 of 1983).  The Board is a 
statutory body and listed as a Schedule 3A entity in terms of the Public 
Finance Management Act, Act 1 of 1999 (PPECB Annual Report, 
2006/2007:32). 
 
The PPECB Board is accountable to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries. The following industries are currently represented on the PPECB 
Board: 
 
Table 3.1:  PPECB Board Members 
INDUSTRY AMOUNT OF MEMBERS 
Citrus Industry 2 
Fishing Industry 1 
Deciduous Industry 2 
Meat and Ostrich Industry 1 
Subtropical Industry 1 
Vegetable Industry 1 
Ministerial Representative 1 
Organised Agriculture Representative 1 
Minority Group Representative 1 
TOTAL 11 Board Members 
 Source: PPECB Annual Report (2006/2007: 9) 
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An elected member of the PPECB Board may be appointed for a maximum 
period of three years and the conditions of such appointment are determined 
by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (PPECB Act, 9 of 1983). 
 
Furthermore, in terms of Section 11 of the PPECB Act (Act 9 of 1983), the 
Board may appoint employees to achieve its objectives.  The PPECB‟s 
organisational structure comprises of a Chief Executive Officer and five 
Executive members, each responsible for specific programmes.  (See Figure 
3.1 below). 
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                                                             PPECB Organisational Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
PPECB OFFICIAL WEBSITE – www.ppecb.com 
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As it can be observed from the organisational structure (Figure 3.1), the 
PPECB is programme driven.  The reason is to remain in touch with a 
specific industry and also to prevent cross-subsidisation of services.  Each 
programme has its own manager, responsible for effective and efficient 
functioning of his/her programme. PPECB has embarked on a programme-
focused strategy to: 
 Improve the culture of service excellence; 
 Improve stakeholder relations; 
 Improve communication; and 
 have a focused approach to market perspectives 
(PPECB, 2008). 
 
In addition, the introduction of the programme management concept has also 
ensured improved flexibility and responsiveness to industry requirements 
(PPECB Export Directory, 2006:5). 
 
3.5 Infrastructure 
 
The PPECB employs over 330 people in total at more than thirty offices 
across South Africa.  More than fifty service types are provided at more than 
1500 locations (PPECB Strategic Document, 2005/2006).  PPECB has an 
annual income of approximately R100 million.  The greater part of the income 
is earned through statutory levies (PPECB Strategic Document, 2005/2006). 
 
3.5.1 Statutory levies  
 
In terms of the nature of the PPECB‟s business, it is entitled to impose a levy 
to recover costs incurred due to the delivery of mandated functions (section 
17 of PPECB Act, Act 9 of 1983).  The Act states clearly that the levy shall be 
paid by the relevant party on which the levy is imposed – clearly securing a 
source of income for the organisation. 
 
The levy is recovered as a fixed cost per carton exported by product type or 
service type delivered (PPECB Strategic Document, 2005/2006). 
41 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the financial performance of the PPECB is likely 
to be impacted on by the marginal growth in export volumes across all 
product groups (PPECB Annual Report, 2006/2007:28).  Export volumes 
have a direct impact on the income and expenditure of the PPECB, making 
the organisation extremely sensitive to market fluctuations. 
 
3.5.2 Customers 
 
The PPECB deals with more than 2500 customers as part of its daily 
activities.  Customers and stakeholders include, but are not limited to: 
 
(PPECB Website: www.ppecb.com) 
 
The PPECB sees its primary service users as the following industries: 
 Citrus Fruit 
 Deciduous fruit 
 Subtropical fruit 
 Flowers 
Government 
Departments 
Retailers 
Port Terminal 
Operators 
Port  
Authorities 
Shipping 
Lines 
Transport 
Operators 
Cold Store 
Operators 
Export 
Agents 
Manufacturers 
Pack  
Houses 
Producer 
Organisations 
Producers 
PPP 
PPECB 
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 Vegetables 
 Meat 
 Wine 
 Seafood 
 Grain 
 Oilseed and 
 Processed products. 
 
(PPECB Strategic Document, 2005/2006) 
 
The PPECB is a customer orientated organisation who constantly explores 
new methods and techniques to improve on client service.  As quoted by the 
CEO (Neels Hubinger, Chief Executive from 1997 to 2007):  “… our role will 
change according to stakeholder and client requirements, all of whom are 
continuously faced with new and changing market requirements.  Therefore, 
our focus will be to respond with service delivery par excellence.  It is clear 
that we must become more market orientated…”  (PPECB Export Directory 
(2006:v)). 
 
Although being a statutory organisation, it is clear that the PPECB‟s 
managing objectives are greatly influenced by the needs of its clients. 
 
Neels Hubinger, the previous CEO of the PPECB, stressed this by saying 
that the New Millennium and future require a new understanding and thinking 
about the business environment of the PPECB and the challenges facing 
such a statutory organisation, in order to remain relevant and able to add 
value in the world of perishable product exports from South Africa (De Beer et 
al., 2003:83).  
 
In addition to the above, the PPECB claims in its quality statement that it is 
committed to meeting customer expectations every time (PPECB Annual 
Report, 2006/2007:5). 
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3.5.3 Service delivery 
 
Delivering a national service to the perishable product industry is more 
complex than may appear on face value.  Apart from the product volume, fruit 
cycles may differ from year to year.  Cycles may start earlier and end later 
than initially anticipated.  In addition, seasons may overlap and service 
providers such as the PPECB need to adapt. The geographic and climatic 
diversity of South Africa makes it possible to provide a comprehensive basket 
of fruit types for relatively long periods of time, as shown in Annexure A (The 
Fresh Produce Exporters Forum, 2003:8). 
 
As stated earlier, the PPECB employs about 330 people, including support 
services staff and management.  Two hundred of the 330 employees are 
operational and passed a total of 180 million cartons of fruit for the export 
market in the 2004/2005 season (PPECB Export Directory, 2006:3-5). 
 
The PPECB moves its staff between production regions, as dictated by 
seasonal activities.  For this reason PPECB employees travel 3.2 million 
kilometres and spend 21 000 man days (3 months) away from their base 
station per year on average (PPECB Strategic Document, 2005/2006).   
 
3.5.4 Operational structure 
 
The operational department of the PPECB is the department mainly 
responsible for fulfilling the organisation‟s statutory mandate.  At the end of 
the 2006/2007 financial year, the operations department brought in ±88 
percent of the total revenue collected (PPECB Annual Report, 2006/2007:29).  
The Operations Department is divided into mainly two value streams, namely 
inspection and cold chain services, each managed by a service programme 
manager. 
 
Furthermore, both inspection and cold chain services are divided into eleven 
regions, each region reporting to a service manager.  Amongst other things, 
service managers are responsible for the co-ordination and planning of 
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activities within their respective regions, the compilation and management of 
the regional budgets, the maintenance of sound industrial relations and the 
servicing of regional client needs.  Authority is therefore fairly decentralised 
by having a manager within the different regions.  The latter structure may 
allow for a more hands-on approach, especially with regards to client needs 
and the responsiveness of the organisation. 
 
It should also be noted that the operational structure is relatively flat, 
minimising the potential for communication distortion (Robbins &  Barnwell, 
2002:97).  (See Figure 3.2.) 
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AMENDED ILLUSTRATION:  
PPECB Website (www.ppecb.com) 
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3.5.5 Business Processes 
 
Because of the nature of the work, the PPECB is bound to an internal 
business management system.  All procedures are documented, spelling 
out precisely what should be done and how. 
 
The positions of those employees who are 100 percent operational are 
highly formalised, leaving not much discretion to the employees in such 
positions, especially in inspections and cold chain services. According to 
Robbins and Barnwell (2002:101), highly formalised positions provide 
consistent results and uniform output. In order to ensure compliance to 
procedures and organisation policies, business processes are audited at 
random, internally and externally. 
 
In addition, the organisation has developed a performance management 
system, whereby the performance of all employees is evaluated and 
appraised every six months.  Performance appraisals ensure that 
employees meet certain performance targets and, as reward, performance 
incentives are awarded on an ad hoc basis. Unfortunately no evidence of 
a defined reward system could be found. In addition to this, the overall 
service of every region is evaluated on an annual basis. This is done 
through a service questionnaire send to clients (Blaauw, October 2008, 
unstructured interview). 
 
3.5.6 Costing 
 
As discussed previously, PPECB collect most of its revenue through 
statutory levies payable for services delivered.  These levies are 
calculated on a basis of cost recovery, per product, per service type – 
meaning that the levy imposed on a product exported must cover the cost 
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of the services delivered for that specific product.  Levies are greatly 
affected by the volume of a product. 
 
The above is made possible by the programme management approach 
and a fairly complex costing model. 
 
3.5.6.1 Timesheets 
 
As a start, operational employees are requested to 
complete a timesheet for each working day.  These 
timesheets contain information such as: 
 The product involved; 
 The type of service delivered by the employee; 
 The number of hours spent on the service; and 
 Whether the hours worked were normal or overtime 
hours 
 
Timesheets are captured once a week and the timesheet 
information is divided into the weeks of the year.  This 
information is readily available to management and allows 
them to make strategic decisions when needed. 
 
The correct completion of these timesheets is critical as it 
will have a huge impact on the determination of levies. 
Furthermore, the amount of hours spend on the services 
as recorded on the timesheet is  crucial, as employee cost 
of the PPECB is just over 70 percent of the total 
expenditure budget (PPECB Annual Report – 
2006/2007:49). 
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For this reason, completed timesheets go through a 
relatively stringent process when authorised, and audited 
on an ad-hoc basis. 
 
 
3.5.6.2 Export inspection values 
 
As part of the operational activities, the PPECB records the 
amount of products inspected and exported.  These export 
and inspection volumes are recorded per product and put 
the PPECB in a position to determine exactly the volumes 
handled at different times of the season.  Having the 
volumes per product, the organisation can calculate which 
product has the biggest volume and should carry the 
biggest proportional cost. 
 
3.5.6.3 Recovery 
 
Having the amount of cargo handled per product and per 
service type, the PPECB can determine what the direct 
cost to deliver the service is and can ensure that it 
recovers its costs.  Added to the direct cost is the cost of 
support services and infrastructure (indirect cost), which 
must also be covered by the levy charged. Indirect costs 
are divided proportionally between the different products. 
 
This ensures that the user of the service or the product 
concerned is charged fairly and minimises or eliminates 
cross-subsidisation.  It can mean that, when exporting 
certain products, the client may pay less compared to other 
products.  It can also mean that certain products may face 
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a greater annual increase than others, and in extreme 
cases certain products may get a levy decrease (Van Zyl, 
July 2007, unstructured interview). 
 
3.6 Deregulation 
 
The latest Perishable Products Export Control Board Act (Act 9 of 1983) 
was promulgated in 1983 and never reviewed since then.  As mentioned 
previously, this Act gives the PPECB the right of existence and spells out 
exactly how the organisation shall operate and how it should be 
structured, amongst other things. 
 
In terms of this Act, the PPECB has the monopoly in dictating the export of 
perishable products from South Africa.  However, in 1997 South African 
fresh produce exports experienced an important environmental change – 
the deregulation of the marketing environment (De Beer et al., 2003:83). 
 
Persistent pressure from market conditions and consumer preferences 
forced the deregulation of South African exports and created the shift in 
responding to market demands as we know it today.  (De Beer et al., 
2003:83).  The PPECB had to let go of some of the stringent controls and 
involvement as prescribed by section 10 of the PPECB Act, (Act 9 of 
1983).  In essence deregulation meant: 
 No controlling of shipping space by the PPECB; 
 No PPECB involvement in the determination of freight rates; 
 Producers can establish their export market without the involvement of 
the PPECB; 
 “Flooding” of export markets in the absence of a body to control the 
demand and supply of products. 
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3.6.1 A new dispensation 
 
Before deregulation, the PPECB dealt mainly with two clients, 
namely Outspan and Unifruco. Fruit was mainly exported under the 
auspices of these two exporters, hence the PPECB only needed to 
deal with them.  Deregulation created a situation where it initially 
seemed less stringent to export and PPECB‟s client base increased 
to about 230 clients almost overnight (De Beer et al., 2003:81). The 
sudden increase in the client base became an administrative 
nightmare and the PPECB needed to adapt fairly quickly in order to 
accommodate its new clients. 
 
Producers and exporters learned that the absence of a controlling 
body could create havoc, as more exporters can flood the markets 
through exporting uncontrolled volumes.  Competing to establish 
export markets drove prices down, resulting in bankruptcies and 
bad debt.  In addition, the fear that South African produce may 
loose integrity on international markets was also looming.  At that 
stage deregulation seemed unmanageable and again required 
establishing the PPECB as statutory body to provide guidance (De 
Beer et al., 2003:81). 
 
 
3.6.2 Industry organisations 
 
It certainly became clear to the export industry that some form of 
regulation is needed for the successful export of perishable 
produce. On the advice of the PPECB, producer organisations such 
as the Deciduous Fruit Producers Trust (DFPT) and Grapes SA 
were the first of producers‟ organisations to be formed. 
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3.6.3 The role of industry organisations 
  
As discussed previously, industry organisations in South Africa 
were established as a direct result of deregulation of the export 
industry.  The establishment of such organisations/forums is a clear 
attempt to regulate and streamline the export of perishable 
products from a producer and/or exporter‟s perspective.  Industry 
organisations focus on: 
 Retaining disciplines that are necessary to ensure quality 
standards; 
 Ensuring environmental and food safety adherence; 
 Funding of research; and 
 Development and promotions (Handbook of South African 
Produce Exports, p. 6, undated) 
 
These objectives, combined with improved communication, are 
ultimately focused on protecting the integrity of South African 
exports. 
 
Industry organisations in South Africa are fairly organised and 
members must comply with a list of criteria and sometimes undergo 
an interview before becoming a registered member.  Such criteria 
may include: 
 Signing a code of conduct; 
 Submit written marketing agreements that they will use with 
their respective clients; and 
 Registering a non-statutory producer trust banking account. 
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It is said that these producers bring a measure of standardisation 
and security to the fruit export business. (Fresh Produce Exporters 
Forum; 2004:5) 
 
Membership of such industry organisations is usually voluntary, but 
members will enjoy much more respect when belonging to a 
recognised industry organisation. 
 
 3.6.3.1 Listed Bodies 
 It is reported that in 2003 375 fresh fruit exporters were 
registered with the PPECB.  Of the 375 exporters, 72 were 
registered with the Fresh Produce Exporters Forum (FPEF).  
Although this may not be the majority of exporters, they 
account for over 80 percent of fresh fruit volumes exported 
from South Africa – giving the FPEF a lot of bargaining 
power.  The FPEF is a voluntary section 21 company with 
the objective to create order in export markets (Fresh 
Produce Exporters Forum; 2004:3-4). 
   
Other industry bodies operating in the South African fruit 
industry are: 
Fruit South Africa 
Deciduous Fruit Producers Trust 
Grapes South Africa 
Citrus SA 
The South African Citrus Growers Association 
The South African Avocado Growers Association 
Subtropicals 
The South African Litchi Growers Association 
The South African Macadamia Growers Association 
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It is reported that these bodies enjoy government recognition 
and great membership support (Handbook of South African 
Produce Exports, p 6). These bodies are free from 
government intervention, as elected members are from the 
private sector. 
 
3.6.4 Industry bodies and the PPECB 
  
Because of the programme management approach followed by 
the PPECB, industry bodies are used as the main channel of 
communication by PPECB product programme managers, when 
they need to communicate with their respective clients.  Product 
programme managers use the respective forums to negotiate levy 
adjustments and service-level agreements, and to discuss policy 
issues (protocols and standards), amongst other things. 
 
The major role players are usually well represented at these 
industry bodies, making bargaining much more effective and 
minimising delays in decisions to be made. 
 
Liaison with industry bodies allow for a more structured approach 
and minimising fragmentation.  To a certain extent industry bodies 
fill the gap that was left by deregulation. 
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3.7 PPECB and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF). 
 
As discussed, the PPECB is a statutory body established in terms of 
legislation. This legislation spells out that the PPECB is accountable to the 
Minister to Agriculture and Land Affairs. 
 
In addition, the PPECB was appointed as assignee of the DAFF for the 
Agricultural Product and Standards (APS) Act, (119 of 1990) in 1991 (De 
Beer et al., 2003:78). As the product standards and requirements under 
the APS act need to be updated on a annual basis, the DAFF has 
established a grading committee, of which the PPECB is a member. On 
this committee the PPECB and representatives of the export industry have 
an opportunity to propose amendments to these documents (Blaauw, 
October 2008, unstructured interview). It is thus obvious that there is a 
close relationship between the PPECB and the DAFF. PPECB is regarded 
by many as an extension of the DAFF – see Annexure B. 
 
The PPECB reported in its 2005/2006 strategic document that the DAFF‟s 
programme 7 strategies relate directly to the core business and strategies 
of the PPECB.  These objectives are: 
 Monitoring the implementation of border control strategy; 
 Ensuring compliance with legislation; 
 Finalising the food safety strategy; 
 Improving communication and national coordination; 
 Centralising and harmonising legislation, codes and guidelines; 
 Implementing progressive service standards that enhance 
credibility; 
 Rationalising resources for maximum effectiveness; 
 Utilising information technology to accelerate information flow, 
facilitate communication and expand surveillance capability; 
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 Participating in meetings of standard-setting bodies to influence 
policies on animal and plant health; 
 Negotiating trade agreements to ensure equitable access to 
markets; 
 Creating partnerships with industry and harnessing available 
resources; and 
 Training and skills development to ensure rapid and efficient 
responses. 
 
PPECB has ensured that its business objectives are aligned with those of 
the DAFF.  Sharing the same objectives will prevent conflict between the 
DAFF and its assignee, the PPECB. This will foster sound working 
relations and a shared vision between the two parties.  
 
As the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries may appoint a 
representative to serve on the PPECB board, the DAFF is certain of 
continuous contact and can also keep a close eye on matters. 
 
3.8 Summary 
 
This chapter touches on the regulation of the export industry and 
agriculture as well as the establishment, roles and functions of the 
Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB). 
 
The export of fruit became regulated in 1910 with the promulgation of the 
Uitvoer van Vruchten Wet.  Since the inception of the legislation, the state 
had a firm grip on the export of fresh produce. The promulgation of the 
Marketing Act in 1937 gave government more control over access to 
agricultural land and access to markets. It is said that control over exports 
and agriculture were not unique to South Africa at the time, but a 
worldwide trend as a result of the Great Depression. This control was a 
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definite measure of governments to ensure food security after the end of 
the World War II. The export and agricultural sectors were strictly 
regulated until the mid-1980s, after which controls were relaxed. 
 
The PPECB was established in 1926 and was mainly tasked to control the 
shipment of perishable produce from South Africa. The PPECB is now a 
statutory organisation, reporting to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries which oversees the export of perishable cargo. In addition, it 
also acts as an assignee for the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, (DAFF) and has taken care of product inspections since 1991 
(De Beer et al., 2003:11).  
 
Because of the flat organisational structure and programme management 
approach, the organisation is fairly responsive to the needs of its clients 
and committed to client satisfaction. The organisation is funded through a 
unique statutory levy structure that is calculated per product and service 
type. Unlike government departments, the PPECB does not rely on 
subsidies from government, but generates its own income. Not having to 
rely on government for funding, the organisation is fairly independent in 
this regard. Organisational resources are used to allow for maximum 
efficiency with a strong focus on internal business processes.  
 
In 1997 the PPECB was in the midst of a process of deregulation, forced 
by drastic changes in the market environment.  This has lead to the 
PPECB losing a large degree of control over export shipping.  This gap 
was later filled by the establishment of industry organisations, taking 
responsibility for regulating fresh fruit exports in fear of losing international 
markets.  Over the years the PPECB and these established organisations 
have formed a close working relationship, as these organisations became 
established representative bodies of the export industries (De Beer et al., 
2003:81). 
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The PPECB positioned itself to be on par with the objectives of the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, (DAFF). By doing this 
the PPECB ensures and acknowledge that they follow the lead of 
government.   
 
The PPECB as the only mandated organisation in South Africa ensuring 
quality standards for perishable produce exports, does not only create a 
single export channel, but allows the South African government to keep a 
close eye on such exports. When we take a look at the relationship 
between the PPECB and government, it may create the impression that 
the PPECB is totally independent from government. However, when you 
take a look at the PPECB board, it tells a different story. By having a 
representative on the board, government keeps itself abreast of 
developments and will intervene when the need arises. 
 
 
The following chapter will analyse the role of the PPECB within the South 
African export arena in the light of the new governance, regulatory 
governance and new pubic management categories, as reviewed in 
Chapter Two.   
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CHAPTER 4:   FINDINGS AND EVALUATIONS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the features outlined in Chapter Three 
with the list of criteria and characteristics for public sector reform in Chapter Two. 
The researcher will break this down into the three categories of new governance, 
regulatory governance and NPM, after which the relevant criteria will be listed 
under each of these headings. 
 
This research study focused on investigating public sector reform within a South 
African context.  The researcher investigated the occurrence of public sector 
reform in the form of new governance, regulatory governance and new pubic 
management (NPM).  This is done by analysing the structure, roles and 
responsibilities of the Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB) as 
case study organisation. 
 
Chapter Two of the study reviewed and outlined the theoretical aspects of public 
sector reform.  Chapter Three of the study provided an overview of the 
establishment and operational structure of the PPECB. 
 
Although the PPECB is a statutory organisation established to control the export 
of perishable products, the organisation‟s objectives and business model tell a 
different story.  It is clear that the organisation is caught between being a control 
body and a partner to the export industry.  The question should be asked 
whether this is a healthy relationship or whether the PPECB finds itself in the 
midst of an identity crisis. 
 
Furthermore, it is claimed that public sector reform is not common in developing 
countries such as South Africa, not even to mention its success in such 
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countries.  The researcher studied the unique relationship between the PPECB, 
government and the export industry of South Africa to determine whether it 
corresponds with any qualities of public sector reform. 
 
In order to analyse and compare this unique relationship, the researcher 
developed a list of qualifying criteria and characteristics for public sector reform 
(Table 2.2), based on the theoretical information gathered.  The list summarises 
the main characteristics of new governance, regulatory governance and NPM, as 
forms of public sector reform.  The list will be used to explore similarities between 
PPECB and public sector reform. 
 
4.2 Compared to new governance 
 
Criterion 1: Involvement of third party actors 
In terms of the South African Constitution, export of cargo ultimately remains 
government‟s responsibility.  Given the statutory mandate of the PPECB, and the 
assigneeship from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the 
fulfilment of this responsibility rests with the PPECB.  It can thus be argued that 
government has outsourced this responsibility by involving the PPECB as third 
party actor. 
 
Criterion 2: Collaborative service delivery, involving public and private sector 
The PPECB‟s board of directors is represented by representatives of industry 
organisations and government.  Services are therefore delivered under the 
watchful eye of both parties.  
 
Criterion 3: Diversification of government services 
Being an assignee of government, it can be argued that the PPECB delivers 
services on behalf of government.  The PPECB delivers a multitude of services, 
including: Inspection and cold chain services, mycotoxin analysis, official food 
safety programme, certification services, specialised and agency services.  The 
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PPECB can be seen as a one-stop service delivery organisation for the export 
industry.  By having the PPECB as an assignee, government offers a diverse 
range of services, although in an indirect manner. 
 
Criterion 4: Establishment of close networks with the third party role players 
Long before the PPECB received assigneeship from the Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the PPECB was established through an act 
of Parliament as a statutory organisation to deliver a service to the fresh produce 
export industry. 
 
This gives the PPECB a right of existence as an entity in its own right.  Assigning 
the PPECB to deliver services on behalf of government, it can be assumed that 
government is in partnership with the PPECB as third party actor. The latter is 
confirmed by the fact that the strategies of these two entities are aligned in order 
to reach shared objectives. 
 
Criterion 5: Activation and sustainability of networks 
Although this study does not reveal the activation of these networks, their 
sustainability can be defined.  It is reported that the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries' strategies relate directly to the core business and 
strategies of the PPECB.  By showing the same strategic objectives, the DAFF 
and the PPECB will not only sustain, but also strengthen, their relationship. The 
alignment of strategies will create a greater degree of co-operation between the 
PPECB as assignee and the DAFF as the mandate giver. 
 
Criterion 6: Introduction of rewards and penalties to stimulate co-operation 
We have learned that the PPECB strives to recover all costs for the services they 
deliver.  As with any other business, certain services will be more expensive than 
others.  For this reason the PPECB has introduced a budgetary system that 
prevents cross-subsidisation between products and services.  This allows the 
PPECB to determine how much a specific service will cost to deliver.  As 
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services are paid for by means of a statutory levy, the latter is influenced by the 
expenditure generated by such service.  Cost may therefore vary between the 
different types of service.  The export industry may thus see a reward (in the form 
of a levy reduction) or penalty (in the form of a levy increase) in the following 
year‟s service cost, depending on the number of hours the PPECB has spent on 
such a service.  This gesture may motivate the export industry to get more 
organised and co-operate with other role-players such as the PPECB, otherwise 
they may forfeit any possibility of a levy reduction. 
 
Criterion 7: No rigid enforcement, but patience, discretion and tact 
Although we‟ve seen that the PPECB strives to establish networks through the 
programme management approach, it should be kept in mind that they do have a 
mandate to fulfil. In addition to this, they are protected by legislation and have the 
advantage of being a sole service provider for the export industry. When every 
soft-skill tactic in the book fails, the PPECB will have no choice but to revert to 
rigid enforcement to reach its objectives – provided that it is within their mandate. 
Patience, tact and discretion can therefore not be guaranteed in the case of the 
PPECB. 
 
4.3 Compared to regulatory governance 
 
It is said that regulatory governance is essential to ensure certain standards, 
enforce uniform standards and create law and order, amongst other things. 
Regulatory governance is especially important when government is accountable 
for a specific service, but does not deliver the service itself. 
 
Criterion 1: Deployment of proper controls 
The PPECB Act clearly states that the PPECB board should be comprised of 
industry representatives and a ministerial representative.  Furthermore, the Act 
states that the PPECB Board is accountable to the Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries.  By including these aspects in the Act, the government 
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can extend a firm degree of control over the functioning of the PPECB.  Although 
distanced from government, a method has been secured for the government to 
keep a close eye on matters. 
 
Although the PPECB acts as an assignee for government in terms of the APS 
Act (Act 119 of 1990), we have found that “the rules of the game” are dictated by 
government.  The quality standards under this particular legislation are amended 
on an annual basis.  This amendment process is dictated by government and 
eventually passed onto the PPECB for implementation.  By doing so, government 
can ensure the publication of uniform and acceptable standards. 
 
Criterion 2: Government is distanced from a service they are accountable for, 
where such service is delivered by a third party 
It has already been determined that government is the accountable authority for 
the export of perishable products.  The responsibility for orderly exports of 
perishable products was transferred to the PPECB with its establishment in 1926.  
Later the PPECB was appointed as the inspection authority for agricultural 
products in 1991.  In terms of the structure and establishment of the PPECB, 
they are regarded as an entity outside of government, although they remain 
accountable to government.  It can be argued that the PPECB has a great 
degree of autonomy and may be seen as a third party, delivering a service on 
behalf of government. 
 
Criterion 3: The actions of a specific industry are controlled or guided by some 
form of policy or document 
The actions of the export industry are governed by the PPECB Act and the APS 
Act.  Both these pieces of legislation spell out the requirements that stakeholders 
within the export industry should adhere to, from the time that product gets 
inspected until it is exported.  These two pieces of legislation can be regarded as 
the bible for the export of perishable products from South Africa. 
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Criterion 4: The type of agency which the PPECB represents 
The literature review revealed that regulatory systems can be divided into 4 main 
types, namely: 
 An agency which is part of government; 
 An agency which is semi-autonomous; 
 An agency which is independent of government; 
 An agency that is self-regulatory and independent from government. 
 
It is interesting to note that the PPECB does not fit one single agency type 
described, but rather reflects a mixture of the different agency characteristics.  
When compared to these main types of agencies, the PPECB does have the 
following characteristics, amongst other things:  
 The PPECB is not part of government, but seen as an entity established in 
terms of legislation; 
 May turn to the outside for opinions; 
 Is independent, but accountable to government; 
 Has government representation; 
 Certain rules (with reference to the APS Act) must be made in accordance 
with government policy/guidelines; 
 Is subjected to the ratification of certain decisions by the relevant Minister; 
 Is a statutory organisation and acts in accordance with principles enacted by 
legislation; 
 Certain PPECB board members are experts in their respective industries, 
recruited from non-government sources, without political affiliations; 
 Some members represent public interest.  In the case of PPECB, the 
ministerial representative represents the Minister, who in turn represents the 
public interest. 
 
Having said this, it is clear that the PPECB operates as an agency on behalf of 
government, although it cannot be associated with one single agency type. It is 
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evident, however, that government has deployed certain controls to ensure that it 
is kept abreast of certain matters.  
 
4.4. Compared to the new pubic management (NPM) 
 
NPM explores ways and means to make government services more efficient and 
effective to the end user.  In the context of South African perishable exports, the 
researcher touches on the delivery of the export service by the PPECB on behalf 
of government, in comparison with the following principles of NPM. 
 
Criterion 1: The promotion of competition and value for money 
The export of perishable products from South Africa is a regulated industry. The 
assurance of quality compliance for agricultural products destined for export and 
their orderly export rests with the PPECB.  It should be noted that the PPECB is 
the sole service provider, leaving no room for competition, which is in definite 
contrast with the principles of NPM.  Furthermore, because of a lack of 
competition, it is extremely difficult to benchmark the service charges of the 
PPECB in order to determine if the end user is getting value for money.  It should 
be stated, however, that the PPECB costs its services based on a break-even 
budget.  In addition to this, industry representatives serving on the PPECB Board 
are probably keeping a watchful eye on the determination of these costs.  It can 
thus be argued that, although the PPECB has the monopoly in delivering a 
service to the South African perishable export industry, the principle of “value for 
money” may be embedded in the determination of the service cost. In addition, 
representatives of industry serving on the Board will ensure that these service 
costs are kept to the bare minimum, as their respective industries are the paying 
clients. 
 
Criterion 2: Service quality and feedback from clients 
Serving the export industry of South Africa, it is obvious that the PPECB should 
have a diverse client base and surely needs to be flexible.  Being a sole service-
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providing parastatal, the idea of service quality would seem unlikely to the critics 
of traditional public administration.  In order to create a culture of service 
excellence, flexibility and responsiveness, the PPECB embarked on a 
programme-focused strategy.  This strategy claims to improve stakeholder 
relations and communication by being in touch with a specific product export 
industry.  In addition, the PPECB CEO‟s commitment to respond to the ever-
changing market requirements with service delivery par excellence is a testimony 
of the organisation‟s intention to listen to the needs of its clients and respond 
accordingly.  Clients are also given an opportunity to express their opinions on 
service delivery on an annual basis, when a service delivery questionnaire is 
handed to them.  Although the questionnaire was not focused on as part of this 
research study, it is worth noting that the negative feedback gets recorded and a 
closing action is required. 
 
Criterion 3: Outcome driven 
The programme management approach discussed earlier is a well-defined 
method of managers focusing on one programme, seeking outcomes.  The 
challenge for these managers is to keep in touch with relevant networks and act 
as a catalyst in reaching a desired outcome – scholars of NPM refer to the 
process as steering instead of rowing.  Being protected by an Act of Parliament 
and a mandate from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the 
pitfall is that these managers get carried away and get involved to such an extent 
that they eventually dictate the whole process.  The researcher can also not 
disregard the possibility that the respective programme managers may get so 
involved with their industries that they operate in silos and ultimately lose sight of 
the bigger organisational picture.  This may cause the organisation to fall victim 
to one of the common problems of NPM, namely, fragmentation. 
 
Notwithstanding the questions surrounding the programme management 
approach, having a dedicated manager for each programme, the organisation is 
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looking for results.  The programme management approach may as well increase 
the odds of getting these results 
 
Criterion 4: Hands-on approach 
The operational structure (Figure 3.2) points out that each region is managed by 
a service manager, who is responsible for operational matters in the region.  If 
clients in these regions are faced with problems, they may be addressed much 
faster because a manager is available. This decentralised structure may ensure 
that the PPECB is closer to its clients and that relationships with clients are 
strengthened.  In addition, information from regions can constantly filter through 
to the decision-makers, allowing the organisation to become more responsive.  
Needless to say, the degree to which clients are assisted will greatly depend on 
the decentralisation of authority within the organisation. 
 
The principle of decentralised authority is also applicable to the relationship 
between the PPECB and the DAFF, in order to empower the PPECB to deliver 
an effective and efficient service to its clients.  
 
Criterion 5: Measures performance and maintain performance through incentives 
and sanctions 
Performance of PPECB employees is continuously measured and appraised. It is 
said that those employees who perform satisfactorily may receive a performance 
incentive.  In the context of NPM there is a strong focus on improving 
performance and rewarding employees accordingly.  The reward system of the 
PPECB is not clearly defined and for this reason it cannot be confidently said that 
the organisation has effectively established a performance management culture. 
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Criterion 6: Allow services to be closer to the client through a process of 
deregulation 
The South African industry was fairly regulated and dictated to by government 
until the mid-1980s, after which government adopted a more relaxed stance.  
This relaxation of the stringent approach spilled over to the perishable export 
industry, which saw a deregulation of mainly the PPECB Act in 1997. 
 
Deregulation opened up the markets and allowed exporters to experience the 
joys of the free market system.  The PPECB saw an explosion of its client base 
and needed to deliver services to many more clients than they were used to.  To 
accommodate clients‟ needs, it is reported that employees move between 
production regions, depending on seasonal activities.  The service is thus taken 
to the client, instead of being a centralised service strategy.  At the same time 
this strategy is complemented by the regional management concept, as 
discussed earlier.  Although the process of deregulation was driven by market 
forces, the end result remains the same – the PPECB is closer to the client than 
ever before. 
 
Criterion 7: Doing away with government subsidies and striving to recover all 
service costs 
The PPECB Act, which gives the right of existence to the organisation, states 
that it is entitled to impose a levy to recover service costs.  The PPECB clearly 
make use of this right and charges a levy for the services delivered.  The 
organisation does not receive any financial assistance from government and is 
therefore financially independent from government.  It is also reported that costs 
are based on a user-pays principle and cross-subsidisation between services 
and/or products is minimised.  Although government remains the accountable 
authority, it can take comfort from the fact that the service delivered by the 
PPECB is financially self-maintained. 
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Criterion 8: Government should give direction and stand back to allow for 
participation 
We have learned that the PPECB is an entity operating outside of government.  
Although accountable to government, the organisation is financially independent, 
has its own operational structure and does not report to government regarding 
operational matters.  It can be argued that government is only involved on a 
strategic level and acts as a watch dog over the affairs of the organisation.  With 
government not interfering with operational matters of the PPECB, decisions can 
certainly be made more quickly, making the organisation more user-friendly.  We 
have also learned that the PPECB has a strong focus on the client and is willing 
to adapt to clients‟ needs. To do this, it is obvious that they need to follow a 
participative approach.  It is also here where the programme management 
approach, as adopted by the organisation, plays a pivotal role.  This approach 
allows these managers to remain closer to clients and increase visibility 
throughout the industry.  Programme managers attend industry forum meetings, 
which is a great platform for information sharing.  Assuming this information is 
relayed to the organisational core and back, this concept is a valuable tool to 
ensure that the industry has a voice in decisions to be made. 
 
Criterion 9: More concerned with the needs of clients than those of the service 
provider 
As the study was not focused on service delivery per se, it is rather difficult to 
comment on whether the PPECB is satisfying the needs of their clients or not. 
In the context of this study, the test would be whether the organisation is 
structured to accommodate clients‟ needs or to satisfy the needs of the 
organisation itself.   By just reviewing what have already been discussed, the 
following aspects are instrumental in evaluating this point: 
 The industry is well represented on the Board of the PPECB; 
 The Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs gets to appoint a member to 
serve on the Board; 
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 Although not clearly defined, there is evidence of a performance management 
system; 
 There is evidence of a client survey questionnaire; 
 The adoption of a programme management approach allows the organisation 
to be closer to the client; 
 The regional management approach (in the form of service managers) allows 
for the service to be taken to the client; and 
 The CEO‟s clear commitment to adapt to the needs of stakeholders and 
clients. 
 
Having said this, although the success of the above has not been tested 
thoroughly, a definite attempt has been made by the PPECB to extend a hand to 
clients.  
 
Criterion 10: The use of service contracts and public-private partnerships to 
reduce service costs 
As discussed earlier, the PPECB is the sole provider that delivers a quality 
assurance and cold chain management service to the export industry.  It is 
therefore difficult to benchmark the service cost of the PPECB.  However, it can 
be argued that the PPECB and Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, are in partnership, involving both private and public role-players.  We 
have learned that the PPECB was assigned to deliver quality inspections on 
behalf of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, in 1991.  it 
should be remembered that by then the PPECB was a well-established 
organisation, delivering a cold chain management service to the export industry.  
It can be assumed that the organisation had an established infrastructure and 
was well known throughout the industry.  Mandating the PPECB was most 
probably less costly than to establish new infrastructure or even keeping the 
service with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.  In this 
regard, the PPECB was therefore a good option to have as a partner.  
 
 70 
Criterion 11: Calls for responsive, efficient and effective service delivery 
Although the study did not focus on the evaluation of the service delivered by the 
PPECB or Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the following 
aspects could not be ignored. 
 
Responsiveness – compared to government, the PPECB with ± 330 employees 
is a relatively small organisation.  The advantages of this are that communication 
is quick, decisions can be made and implemented with fewer bureaucratic 
stumbling blocks, and hence the response time of the organisation as a whole 
can be quicker compared to that of large bureaucracies. 
 
Effectiveness – The PPECB is focused on delivering a quality assurance and 
cold chain management service. If the service was to be delivered by 
government itself, it would probably have been a section within a government 
department.  This would have meant that the focus of such department would 
have been divided between its different sections.  The PPECB as an organisation 
devotes its whole strategy and operations to deliver a quality assurance and cold 
chain service to the export industry.  The organisation therefore has the edge in 
being more effective in its business compared to larger bureaucracies delivering 
the service as part of their business strategy.  
 
Efficiency – One of the aspects that stood out was the way in which the PPECB 
utilises its human resources.  Employees are moved between production regions 
following fruit seasons.  Although this might be uncomfortable for personnel, by 
doing this the organisation uses its personnel to their full potential.  This prevents 
the unnecessary appointment of additional personnel and amounts to a saving 
on personnel cost.  Furthermore, personnel get more exposure and gain 
experience at the same time. 
 
Having said all this, the question remains whether there is enough evidence to 
say that the relationship between PPECB and government as well as the manner 
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in which the service by the PPECB is delivered can be regarded as a 
phenomenon of public sector reform in a South African context. 
 
Based on the analysis made, it is clear that there are certainly criteria counting in 
favour of the public sector reform debate and others counting against it. 
 
The mere fact that the PPECB is established by an Act of Parliament is certainly 
one of the greater stumbling blocks in the argument in favour of public sector 
reform, especially measured against NPM.  This statutory right of existence 
makes the PPECB the sole service provider for cold chain services and gives it 
the monopoly in delivering the services.  This automatically prevents the 
promotion of competition and gives clients no alternative but to make use of the 
PPECB when they intend to export perishable products. 
 
Furthermore, when compared to regulatory governance, the PPECB structure did 
not fit one specific agency type, but contained characteristics of all four 
recognised agency types.  On face value, the PPECB may be seen as an entity 
operating totally independently from government.  Investigation has shown that, 
although not obviously in evidence, the government has ensured that it does 
keep proper control by making the PPECB accountable to government and 
ensuring ex officio representation on the PPECB Board of Directors. Government 
is therefore controlling the PPECB closely. 
 
It should also be remembered that, because the PPECB is mandated by 
legislation, it is obligated to fulfil this mandate at all costa.  When reflecting on 
new governance, there is a strong belief that organisations should establish 
networks with stakeholders and create a culture of negotiation – as the PPECB 
rightfully did. It should be remembered, however, that the PPECB can negotiate 
with stakeholders only to a certain extent.  The bottom line of the negotiation will 
be that the PPECB needs to honour its legislative obligations.  It is therefore no 
secret that certain aspects are non-negotiable as they are prescribed by law.  
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The PPECB will go into a negotiation, provided that this is within its mandate, 
having the upper hand.  When such negotiation fails, the PPECB will always 
have the benefit of referring back to the Act. 
 
In addition, the PPECB‟s commitment to serve the client‟s needs is quite clear.  It 
makes use of a structured system to keep in contact with clients and networks. 
This gives the organisation the opportunity to be responsive and address client 
needs accordingly. 
 
The organisation measures the performance of its employees continuously by 
means of a performance management system. 
 
The PPECB Board of Directors is represented by role-players from both the 
public and private sectors.  It can thus be assumed that decisions on this level 
are therefore made to the satisfaction of both government and role-players from 
the respective industry. 
 
On the financial front, the organisation is financially independent from 
government and does not receive government subsidies in any form.  The author 
has learned that all service costs are recovered by means of a statutory levy. 
 
Taking into consideration arguments counting both for and against this being a 
phenomenon of public sector reform, it can be safely argued that the PPECB is a 
hybrid between traditional public administration and public sector reform (defined 
as new governance, regulatory governance and NPM).  The organisation will 
continue to face an identity crisis of being both a regulator and service provider to 
the export industry.  The test will be whether the organisation can withstand the 
increased pressure of true reform.  Government may in future be faced with calls 
for competition to the PPECB that will provide an opportunity to choose between 
service providers. Another alternative is also to explore the possibility of self-
regulation by the export industry. 
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 Although the current operation is functioning, it is recommended that a more 
defined model be developed that allow for competition in delivering a quality 
assurance service to the South African export industry.  
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As the world changes at an ever-increasing pace, society is forced to change in 
order to keep abreast with these developments.  Public sectors across the globe 
have not been spared the need to adapt to such change. 
 
As long as most of us can remember, public institutions have stuck to the 
traditional ways and means of addressing public needs.  The traditional model of 
public administration came under attack during 1980s.  It was said that the model 
is too slow, inefficient, ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of service 
users.  Critics accused the model of being outdated and not suitable to address 
current needs.  Slowly but surely it was accepted that perhaps the traditional 
model did have a few shortcomings and that the public sector was due for 
reform.  Such reform is needed to ensure that the public sector become effective 
and efficient by adapting to the changes in society. 
 
The foregoing pages investigated public sector reform under the umbrella of new 
governance, regulatory governance and new pubic management (NPM) as a 
substitute for traditional public administration. 
 
It should be stated, however, that traditional public administration is well rooted 
throughout the public sector and will surely not be phased out overnight and 
without repercussions. 
 
5.2 Public sector reform 
Calls for public sector reform have been around for some time and different 
examples of different models can be found throughout the world, surprisingly 
even in developing countries.  We have learned that certain forms of public 
sector reform are fairly common in some developing countries and have even 
produced positive results by increasing the amount of revenue collected.  The 
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drawback of such bureaucracies in developing countries is that they are often 
characterised by huge and clumsy bureaucracies, often still depending on 
centralised decision-making.  In order for public sector reform to be a success, 
the public sector needs to redefine itself completely.  Reform requires change in 
structure, skills and the way the public conducts its business.  The question that 
needs to be asked is: how did reform evolve? 
 
Not so long ago, the public sector was at the centre in providing societal needs.  
The public sector was then used to provide only the basic needs of the 
population.  As time went by, the needs of society have changed and the public 
sector was forced to extend the services it delivers.  This trend continued for 
some time and the services that were demanded by the needs of society have 
become so diverse that the public sector could not meet this demand. 
 
In many instances government found itself short of expertise or even capacity, 
hence the need to involve outside actors to deliver such services. Although the 
actual delivery of such services could be outsourced, government remains 
accountable for such services. This called for some form of control over these 
outside actors, as the accountable authority and those responsible to deliver the 
service are now separated. It was noted that with the traditional administration 
model government had direct control over those delivering government services. 
Government was then in a position to easily dictate the way these services 
should be delivered and could intervene at any stage. With outside actors 
involved, the picture is a bit different. Government no longer has direct control 
over these actors as they fall outside hierarchical structure of government.  
 
5.3 New Governance 
It is at this point where the principles of new governance become very prominent. 
It is said that when government reforms, it should not only adapt in structure, but 
also in the way they operate and importantly their approach. Amongst other 
things, some of the outstanding principles required by new governance are for 
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government to move away from a hierarchical approach to a network approach. 
Government needs to interact with third party actors and establish a network of 
players they can rely on to assist with service delivery.  
 
Government also needs to regard private sector actors as a partner to reach the 
desired objectives, and not as competition. Government needs to narrow the gap 
between itself and the private sector. These two sectors must learn to work 
together and complement each other by bringing their respective expertise to the 
table. It is also said that government is so used to dictating and controlling that 
they need to adapt their approach to negotiation and persuasion. Government 
officials should also accept that they are not in a position to command private 
actors and decisions need to be based on consensus. 
 
5.4 Regulatory governance 
This is also where the phenomenon of regulatory governance becomes relevant.  
As government is no longer in direct control of the services they are accountable 
for, they need to put measures in place to regulate these services – such 
methods of control will depend on the situation, and may include legislation and 
the ratification of decisions by government personnel.  Again government should 
realise that it is now in partnership with these third party actors and not in control 
of them. 
 
5.5 New public management (NPM) 
In addition, NPM focuses on customising techniques from the private profit sector 
and uses them in the public sector. The main objective of NPM is also to ensure 
that the public sector functions more effectively and efficiently. NPM also has a 
strong focus on feedback from service users. Government therefore needs to 
recognise the importance of client feedback and create a system where clients 
are afforded the opportunity to give feedback.  Such feedback should be noted 
and, if valid, used to inform future service delivery. Furthermore, NPM regards 
the measurement of employee performance as important to ensure that the 
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service standards of the organisation are met. NPM is outcome driven and 
believes that the service should be close to the client. 
 
Where the traditional public administration model was much concerned with the 
bureaucracy itself, public sector reform has a strong focus on involving outside 
actors and getting feedback from service users. It is believed, however, that 
successful public sector reform is fairly new and said to be uncommon in 
developing countries.  This research study highlights the regulation of the 
perishable product exports in South Africa, based on the principles of public 
sector reform. 
 
In order to distinguish between public sector reform and traditional public 
administration, the researcher has developed a list of qualifying criteria and 
characteristics for public sector reform, divided into the categories of new 
governance, regulatory governance and NPM.   
 
When light is shed on the model on which the export of perishable products from 
South Africa is based, the model appears to be ahead of its time and rare for a 
developing country. The researcher analysed the structure and operation of the 
Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB), an organisation mandated 
to oversee the export of perishable products and the inspection of agricultural 
products.  
 
5.6 The role of the Perishable Export Control Board (PPECB) 
It is stipulated in the Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) that the 
responsibility of trade is that of government. Though it is widely speculated as to 
why this responsibility was already handed over to the PPECB back in 1926, the 
researcher can assume government wanted the service to be delivered by a 
body dedicated to dealing solely with exports – as times changed, so the 
economic and political environment of South Africa has changed drastically. 
Surprisingly the arrangement with the PPECB has been kept intact.  Even more, 
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in 1991 the PPECB was mandated to deliver the quality inspection services on 
behalf of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). Though it 
is again speculated as to why the PPECB was trusted to do so, it is safe to 
assume it was because the PPECB had an established infrastructure and proven 
success with regulating the export of perishable produce. 
 
With the democratisation of South Africa the Constitution paved the way for 
government to be committed to service delivery and public participation, amongst 
other things – aspects which form some of the main building blocks of NPM. 
 
The PPECB has been controlling perishable exports for more than 80 years and 
its familiarity with the business is definitely noteworthy.  The model on which the 
export control service is based corresponds with quite a few of the requirements 
in the list of qualifying criteria or characteristics for public sector reform.  The fact 
that the PPECB is a statutory organisation blurs many of these resemblances. 
 
Although the PPECB is directly responsible for overseeing the export service, the 
South African government remains accountable to ensure that exports as a 
whole stay on track.  It is said that the South African export industry makes up a 
massive 25 percent of everything produced locally, of which perishable exports 
amounts to R7 billion.  It is therefore no surprise that government wants to keep 
a watchful eye on the services delivered by the PPECB.  By having a ministerial 
representative serving on the PPECB board, government (in the form of the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) ensures that it forms part of 
decisions made on the highest level within the organisation. 
 
Given the fact that the PPECB is established in terms of legislation, and that it 
has ministerial representation but is independent from government, it is a classic 
example of regulatory governance.  Although the model consists of criteria that 
are indicative of all four of the familiar regulatory agency types, the objective of 
regulating an agency of state cannot be overlooked. 
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When reference is made to the services delivered by the PPECB, and more so 
the way these services are delivered, it should be noted that the organisation 
may find itself somewhere between being a regulator and a service-providing 
organisation. 
 
It was noted that the PPECB is structured to take the service to its clients.  The 
somewhat decentralised approach, by having regional managers spread across 
the country, is said to increase the response time as it allow for better flow of 
information.  The needs of clients can be attended to almost immediately, without 
having to follow a long bureaucratic process so often synonymous with traditional 
public administration.  In addition to the client-friendly structured design, the 
organisation uses a client feedback system to evaluate the service delivered to 
clients.  These qualities, to mention only a few of them, are indicative of a new 
pubic management (NPM) style.  Irrespective of its statutory mandate, the 
PPECB is almost bending backwards to serve the needs of its clients. As can be 
recalled, NPM was initially brought to life to focus more on the importance of 
clients. 
 
When the PPECB is thus measured against the qualifying criteria or 
characteristics of NPM, the way that the PPECB does its business comes 
relatively close to meeting these requirements.  In addition to the PPECB‟s core 
services being decentralised, it includes its major stakeholders in its decision-
making, measures the performance of its employees and has a strong focus on 
excellent service delivery.  Having said all this, however, it should be noted that 
one of the most important aspects of NPM is the promotion of competition and 
ensuring that service delivered represents value for money. 
 
Because of the statutory nature of the PPECB, service users do not have an 
option when it comes to the export of perishable products other than the PPECB.  
This criterion appears to be the biggest stumbling block between the South 
African export model and NPM.  When this aspect was unpacked, the point of 
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value for money seems to be established by the representation of the export 
industry on the PPECB board.  The adherence to promotion of competition does 
not feature in any way; hence it is in contrast with the principles of NPM. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, in order to determine whether the regulation of the 
South African perishable export industry represents public sector reform in any 
way, the answer will certainly not be bound to one simple factor. When looking at 
the functioning of the model from a macro perspective, certain aspects cannot be 
argued against. 
 
The South African government does not regulate the export of perishable 
products itself, nor does it deliver the quality inspection service.  Both these 
functions are delivered by a third party actor. 
 
In the light of what was discussed in the study, it is clear that when the model is 
tested against the qualifying criteria for public sector reform, most of the 
arguments were in favour of the model showing resemblances to public sector 
reform.  The breakthrough in establishing these resembles is both in how the 
model is structured and the methods used by the PPECB to deliver the service.  
A further major factor is the fact that, although the PPECB and DAFF do have a 
close working relationship, the PPECB is mostly left alone to dictate the delivery 
of the service, with the exception of the determination of quality standards for the 
season.  
 
What stood out about the model is that it contains a mixture of the qualities of 
new governance, regulatory governance and NPM.  When compared to 
regulatory systems, we have learned that the model even contains qualities of all 
four major agency types.  With the exception of promoting competition, the model 
used to regulate the export of perishable products in South Africa is a hybrid 
between new governance, regulatory governance and NPM. The model displays 
enough qualities, both from a macro and micro perspective, to convincingly 
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qualify as public sector reform in its basic form.  Though successful public sector 
reform appears to be fairly uncommon in developing countries, South Africa has 
been using such unconventional strategies successfully for a number of years. 
 
The challenge of this model is whether it can continue to function successfully in 
its current form.  Furthermore, it should also be asked whether the PPECB can 
keep on acting as referee and player by being protected by legislation to regulate 
the export industry and projecting an image of being a partner with industry 
stakeholders.  The South African government will probably face calls for 
competition for the PPECB, if the financial pressure increases in the industry.  In 
order to ensure the existence of successful perishable exports, government will 
eventually be forced to look at alternative models. 
 
5.7 The road ahead   
This particular study did not look into possibilities for alternative models on which 
South African exports can be based. It is recommended, however, that the 
perishable product export environment be analysed to determine the needs of 
this influential industry. It should then be determined what the role of government 
should be and if the industry should be regulated in future.  Also, it should be 
considered whether the solution would not be a clear separation between the 
mandate giver (government) and a service provider to the export industry.  
The outcome of the investigation should then guide the design of a model, 
displaying the functioning of the South African perishable product export industry.  
This study leaves space for further investigation and research with endless 
possibilities. 
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ANNEXURE A: South African Fruit Distribution Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fresh Produce Exporters Forum (2003:8) 
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ANNEXURE B:  DAFF Macro Organisational Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2006:24). 
